

FOUNDATIONS OF US-RUSSIAN DISAGREEMENT: THE NEW NORMAL IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

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The topic of today's talk is why the point we are at right now in the history of Euro-Atlantic relations can be described as a "new norm". It is not a discussion about past achievements or past failures, it is not a talk about the consequences of the Cold War, who won and who lost. It is a talk about how the future would look like, and what can be a preferable future for all parts of the Euro-Atlantic region. I believe that we are at a decisive point that we will show how exactly Russia and the West will feel towards each other in the coming generation or two. I also believe that even being adversaries or being partners in a semi-confrontational period is not the worst kinds of future we actually can have.

I will start with a not very obvious point – with the death of Russian once prominent military commander, head of the Russian military intelligence service Igor Sergun. He died in January 2016 in Moscow, which seemed to be from a heart attack. This person has been in charge for most important Russian military activities outside and inside the country starting with the North Caucasian operations throughout the 1990s and 2000s. He is a person who is described by many as a "troublingly imaginative architect" of Russian operations in Ukraine. But most importantly he was the person who was very eager to establish a strategic dialogue with Western counterparts, primarily with the American military intelligence. And with very surprising development throughout 2012 and 2013, throughout the third term of Vladimir Putin's presidency, and throughout the time when the narrative regarding the Western relations with Russia started to be very bad, real strategic dialogue between the two sides was established. Joint meetings between the military commanders of Russia and the United States were held, and these discussions developed into a form that was very strange if you compare it to the mainstream media attitude towards the bilateral relations.

These quotations are coming from the article by a senior American military attaché to Russia at the time, Peter Zwack. He says, "even as Sergun relentlessly directed global intelligence operations against our interests, he — paradoxically — also viewed constant confrontation with the U.S. and West as not in Russia's best long-term interest". And if we can sum up what was going on for these two years of these surprising developments, it was a dialogue which was sustained and which helped to reveal for the two sides – Russia and the United States – why exactly they did disagree: the topics like Ukraine, Syria crisis, Arab Spring and all others. And after calculus, they managed to agree on the points where their interests coincided and where they did have a common agenda, and those included radicalism of Islam in Afghanistan and Central Asia, global terrorism, catastrophic consequences of climate change, and so on. This was the next generation geostrategic challenges dialogue between adversaries.

So we can say that for a very short moment on this decade we had a realist moment into Russian-American relations. It was sustained only for two years. It has collapsed basically with the start of the Ukrainian crisis in late 2014. Russia was perceived as an aggressor in the crisis, United States was perceived in Russia as a country that supported the coup in Ukraine, which harmed

Russian interests. Historical mistrust gained the upper hand, and the dialogue had some achievements was closed.

Why wasn't it sustained? Why do the institutes that were destined to be a channel of communication between the two states never work? Russia-NATO Council, some other institutes of the strategic dialogue – did not work in a crisis. The issue is that the discussion took place outside the agreed strategic framework. What is the future that we will face in one generation? Where does Russia fit in it, where do the United States fit in it? Is this a future of confrontation, or is it a combination of everything – with confrontation and cooperation in some areas?

To try to figure out how the strategic framework of these bilateral relations can look like in the future, we need to get an understanding what exactly the strategic priorities are for both countries, to consider how they view the world order in a generation from now, and try to figure out whether these views are of confrontational nature or they permit some coexistence and partnership.

It is clear that assumptions regarding the world order are different for the United States and Russia. This comes from different strategic experience for these two countries.

The United States is a classical maritime power, its profits rest on commerce, it is a very self-sufficient market – it produces a lot and it consumes a lot. Moreover, it historically paid very small price for maintaining security. The minimum parameters for achieving security for the US is just a military preponderance on the continent and access denial to the nearby waters to any hostile power. The United States throughout its history has developed a very sophisticated and prosperous society, which is due to talents of American people, very favorable security and economic environment around it. This helped the United States to get maximum of its security requirements.

We can witness this in their global security record. American navy is present throughout the global oceans, military alliances that United States built help to preserve these naval bases throughout the world. The United States learning how to offshore balancing in preventing emergence of important power or gravity centers elsewhere, or make those powers not adversaries or enemies to American leadership. Probably most importantly – the undisputed leadership of the United States in the community of free market democracies. Maybe the dynamic would be different if Germany or somebody else aspired to lead the West. But since this community has the United States as a leader, United States sees enlargement of market democracies around the world as its security priority.

As far as Russia is concerned, it is the biggest land country with the longest land border on the planet. It is a very fragile country. The density of population is very low, and Russia has the biggest number of very different neighbors. From one side it neighbors Norway, a very stable European democracy and a very peaceful one. It also neighbors China and North Korea. It has a sea border with Japan and the United States. It has a border with the restive South Caucasus and Central Asia. Throughout years, Russia needed to develop very sophisticated diplomatic service and a very sophisticated military to sustain both – constant strategic dialogue with partners and use force when necessary.

The minimum prerequisite for Russian security is very hard to achieve. And this means that throughout history Russia has developed concept of strategic depths. Since the Eurasian plain is very plain, there are very few mountains – the Urals are very small mountains, Russia historically has been considering its vital security prerequisite to have a military primacy and access denial to any external power to its neighboring belt. Competitors are very important right now for Russia and there are a number of them, but historically speaking Russian territorial ambitions beyond this neighbouring belt, beyond its near abroad, have been very limited. The situation that we saw after the Second World War with the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was very unusual. This was an anomaly happening because of a weak Germany, which is a very unusual thing for Europe to have.

The maximum prerequisite of Russian security, which it very hard to achieve, is to establish a favorable balance of powers in Eurasia that takes into account interests of other major players. Russia believes that it can have a relatively peaceful system around itself only when other major players have a stake in it. The two consequent Russia former Foreign Ministers Evgeniy Primakov and Igor Ivanov witnessed that active foreign policy – even proactive foreign policy – is a prerequisite for Russian internal stability and its security. And if United States can afford isolation from time to time, Russia has never been in place when it can afford it.

In the core of US-Russia disagreements is a collision of worldviews. The United States believes it is destined to be a global leader, while Russia does not feel that joining the system that the United States is leading would address its security concerns. Would NATO ever discuss any Russian security issues – its border with North Korea or spillover from Afghanistan, stability in Central Asia or conflicts in the South Caucasus, or Islamic extremism in North Caucasus? It is not because Russia never tried to join the West – in fact several Russian administrations in different times of history tried to put joining the West as a top priority for Russian security and foreign policy. Moreover, if in one of those periods would have produced sustainable result, Russia would have indeed joined the West and its security institutes. Nevertheless, this option proved to be useless in practice, so Russia had to resort to sorting out its security interests itself. Since most of them located around Russian perimeter – in CIS countries – this area became the main source of frictions between Russia and the West.

What are the ordinary options to address these Russian concerns in the West? There are quite a few of them and I think that they are quite well elaborated. The mainstream view is that you should press Russia until it surrenders. Since Russia is very weak, it is irrelevant and it can very easily be pressed. Or, since Russia is a declining power and doomed to collapse, you need to wait it out. A smaller group, American realists, say that we are heading towards a world that we do not understand completely. But it seems that it is not a Cold War anymore, we do not have one single enemy, and if we do – it is not Russia. And since that – do we really want a Russia that feels threatened and insecure and that reacts? Probably we need to abandon the hopes of transforming this country, recognizing that we need it in the equilibrium of the future.

In January 2016 Henry Kissinger was in Moscow to deliver several talks, I visited one of these talks. What he was saying was that we have two different well-grounded in experience perceptions of the world order. For the United States the inevitable democratic revolution should occur, including in Russia, and the international system should be essentially governed by legal rules. However, for Russia it would all the time be a world with a significant geopolitical or

strategic aspect in it. And Moscow's vision is based both on legal and strategic perspective. The major problem here in merging legal and strategic approaches, and there is no single answer how to do it. The mainstream narrative tries to solve this problem both in Russia and the West blaming the other side.

Fundamentals of Russian strategy

I think it was Thomas Graham who quite consciously made an observation on this in his New York Times article two years ago. He said, that victory is complete when one's enemy decides to emulate you. But Russia decided not to go to the free market democracy prescribed as endpoint from communism. We can discuss whether Russia is a democracy and whether free market is there. The problem is that can Russia be a normal European country everybody in the West would like it to be – a new Poland, or a new Germany? Can it be an easily accessible and very understandable country which it should be as a part of Europe? Or as Angela Stent put it – why Russians are so 'reluctant Europeans'? Why can not Russia be like all other European countries? I think there is an answer to this question.

Looking at the objective parameters of Russia as an international object you can see striking differences from any ordinary European state. If you leave out of consideration exceptional position of Russia in geography, in its density of population, in its security environment – you will miss the point. You would not understand how both Russian population and Russian elites think about Russia's role. The fundamentals of Russian security should also be a point of discussion, because when you do not get to the point what is Russia, you will be missing important conclusions on how Russia can fit into the Euro-Atlantic security dimension.

Could have Russia been a normal European state? It could have. Medieval Russia had all its borders completely in Europe – it never reached the Urals. At that time Russian kingdoms were located up to what is now Yoshkar-Ola (Mariy El), Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan. If any important major gravitation center had emerged east to Russia – say, if the Golden Horde had formed a viable state in the Urals – you would have a completely European Russia, a country that is like all others – like Poland or Germany.

Why did it never happen? The most formative experience for Russia as a state was an external stress, a stress that was posed by the Golden Horde – the Mongol-Tartar invasion. Medieval Russia had four different centers that could have been a core of the future Russian state. The competition between Kyiv, Novgorod, Vilno (mostly Slavic and orthodox kingdom), and Moscow was very strong. These four centers represented four different types of economic and security arrangements. And the competition between them was a historical experiment of power consolidation on East-European plain. Lithuania, later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was very tightly connected to the West Europe. Novgorod was a republic that was very much involved in sea trade with cities in Germany and with Scandinavian peoples. Kyiv was very fertile, very densely populated kingdom oriented to both the East and the West. Moscow, a very tiny city deep in the forest, away from major trade routes with very low density of population – for some reason won this competition. What was the reason for this?

The thing is that the external stress of the Golden Horde helped to sustain in Moscow the type of economic and military structure, which was focused on mobilization of all resources available. Frontier fortifications system against Tatar invasions was the most important phenomena of

Russian medieval and early modern history – and it was built by Moscow. It was something like the Chinese wall, but longer and less durable – stretching from Kaluga to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. In the 18th century, these fortifications moved to Central Asia and stopped there.

How did it look like and what did it mean for the Russian state to man these fortifications and sustain them? As Russian historian Vasiliy Klutchevsky put it, thousands of Russians were yearly taken as prisoners by the tartars, and tens of thousands of Russians were working to man these defensive lines. And it was probably the most fantastic security program Russia has ever performed throughout its history. From time to time, the percentage of security expenditures in the budget of the Russian state was up to 70-90%. Raid economies of tartar kingdoms, which kidnapped a lot of people and prevented stone building in Russian territories for two centuries, were a devastating experience for Russia.

This Moscow experiment was successful and was sustained. Eventually Russia defeated tartars. Moscow took Novgorod and then under Ivan the Fourth it conquered Astrakhan and Kazan, the two major tartar kingdoms. Following just in one hundred years small detachments of kozaks reached the Pacific Ocean without any significant resistance. By the beginning of the 18th century, when Peter the Great established a new capital in Saint-Petersburg, Russia has been in its borders as we know it today – only without Northern Caucasus and Khabarovsk region.

So for three centuries Russia sustained itself in its current borders. The magnitude of the stresses has helped Russia to sustain its very spectacular and different mode of statehood. And, thus, the doctrine of strategic depth has emerged. This is a quotation from Dmitriy Trenin ‘End of Eurasia’, where he speaks about the period when the borders and these defensive lines stopped to be means of immediate military protection, and this strategic depth concept became the principle means of national defense – to have a spare territory between itself and any possible adversary who can come from the outside. And it worked very well when invasions stopped coming from the East and started to come from the West.

Today Russia is a huge country, it is mainly a plain territory with very few mountains. 75% of Russia’s territory lie above the 60th parallel north, and 25% of its territory lie above the Arctic circle. The gravity center of Russia is located in its European part, 75% of its population live and 75% of its GDP is produced here. Russia has 11 time zones and it needs to sustain the same level of infrastructure, social security, medicine, education from Anadyr to Magadan and to Kaliningrad and Murmansk etc. It is a hard experience for any government, and we do not have any other example of governing this kind of territories anywhere else on the planet.

Thus the ‘otherness’ of Russia has formed. It’s most important parameter – very low density of population. The average for Europe is 130 people per sq km – in France, in Germany it is 255, in Great Britain it is even higher, in Russia it is 8,6. The most populated European part of Russia has only 27 people per sq km, in Ukraine it is 75. In the United States it is not high – a little more than 30.

Secondly, it is insecure borders and lack of natural obstacles, long and fragile transport communications. It is hard to imagine how Peter the Great actually ruled Siberia of the Far East. For example, he would ask a voevoda, a commander, to send forces from Tobolsk to Crimea where tartars raided – and this message would be delivered in several months, and then it would take another year for people to actually arrive there.

Thirdly, northern climate and small crops. There are very honest and provoking observations by Vasiliy Klutshevskiy about the Russian character and how this northern climate and small crops influence the forming of this character. He writes why Russians are very good at mobilizing in a very short time while they need to get this crop done in only several months. And then throughout winter they can do nothing, relax and be very contemplative.

Fourthly, it is a multiethnic society. From the very beginning of the Moscow kingdom history Russia has been multiethnic. The famous tale of Kassimov city, which is located about 60 km from Moscow and which was given to one of the Tartar Hordes, who joined Moscow prince as a loyal army and who until Catherine the Great time had been communicated to by the Foreign Ministry. These people had been living in an absolute enclave without merging with other people around it. Kassimov city is still holding one of the biggest mosques around Moscow. Currently Russia has a significant not-Russian population in Tatarstan, Bashkortastan and in the North Caucasus.

Fifthly, Russian economy and its industrialization, which in the communist times was performed as a plan-based structure. Now it is going through a very painful process of trying to establish a new basis for itself – a capitalist economy. And all these problems, as we call them, ‘mono-industrial city’ where you have only one major factory that is not very relevant right now, and you have around 100 thousand people living there, and the major task is what to do with their jobs.

Another point is global regional power – by this I mean that Russian international outreach has been very limited historically. The communist period was not a norm for the Russian outreach. But since Russia neighbors so many very different nations, it unintentionally becomes a global player. We neighbor the United States, Japan, China. Our security is tightly connected with the situation in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, etc.

And lastly, the gravity center of Russia is in Europe, fragile communications connect it with the east and south of the country. In many places in the country the crops cannot be planted, and we have northern sea routes – in Russian ‘severnyi zavoz’, when food is delivered by ships to Norilsk and some other northern cities of Russia. It is still a very monumental survival experience.

I think that all this complexity makes Russia a very unusual European state that does not comply with the prerequisites of what it means to be a Western country. And until we agree that it is alright, we will not be able to start a discussion.

The perception of Russia that Western elites are not prepared to get through these very sophisticated details of Russian security and to see them as vital to Russia – have sustained the views inside Russia that the only possible foreign policy strategy would be to sustain its own national interests and not to join anybody else.

Russian Westernizers and Statists

This discussion was to present you why there is a discussion between the three branches of Russian foreign policy thinking – the Westernizers, the statists and the civilizationists. The statists are continuously winning. It is not because Russia does not like an attempt of joining the

West – it has tried several times and very sincerely. The best and brightest Russian people were leading Russia at that time and they failed.

Milyukov alignment course during the First World war prevented the post-tzarist Russia – the White Russia – from beating communists. Milyukov thought that if we by any means had joined the West and struggle Germans in Europe, they would have assisted us afterwards in fighting communists – and they did not. They did not try and they did not see it as a threat or just did not care. But if Milyukov had not thought that the number one enemy is communists, and they needed to be fought against – probably we would have a different Russia without communists.

Gorbachev's New Political thinking was also prioritizing ties with the West. But for many Russians the results of his reforms were a catastrophe. Putin spoke about a geopolitical catastrophe, what did he mean exactly? It was not because, in the first place, that Russian foreign policy position has diminished – it was mainly because demographically, economically it was an absolutely devastating experience. Every second child was not born, every second marriage collapsed, GDP per capita dropped severely. And it was sustained for about a decade and even more. And the harms that were inflicted to the society are never forgotten.

So the statist agenda inside Russia has won. And in my observations, even if Vladimir Putin steps down, any government that succeeds him will return to the same route that we observe right now. I think that even if Aleksey Navalnyi comes as a leader of Russia, his alternatives will be very limited. If he wanted to sustain Russia as geographically the same state it is right now, in several years he would come to the same platform we already know. Aleksey Kozyrev, who is assumed to be the most important Westernizer in modern Russian foreign policy, during his last years in office was going towards this statist agenda. This was not because he wanted to follow that route, but because he wanted to maintain Russia's security.

So I would say that Russia has reached its historical norm. This kind of Russia you have is a 'normal' Russia. If it was somehow different – more pro-European or pro-Asian, it would not be sustainable.

There are quite few analyses of possible solutions to this 'Russia question' in the Euro-Atlantic security. One of it says that Russia should again become a normal European state by splitting into several smaller states and returning to its middle ages borders. This interpretation does not fit into what Russia thinks about itself.

For now, I think we have a mainstream doctrine concerning Russian-Western relations of selective engagement. The West believes that Russia is not that important, it produces minor problems and it is not much attractive. It believes that it can develop and go towards a better world without Russia – isolate it or ignore it. It was manifested very vividly in a conversation that Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush were having about the ABM system in Europe around 2006.

Putin was saying to Bush: "Do you understand that you will be provoking us and we will have to reciprocate and react somehow if you put this system in Europe?" and Bush responded in the formula of three parts, he said: "Relax, we are not enemies. Do what you want and we will do what we want". What does this mean? It means that "we will not intentionally plot against you and we hope that you also will not plot against us, but if unintentionally something that we do

would hurt your interests, that is not our fault, because you are not significant enough to harm our interests, and we can afford to ignore it whatever you would do". This platform was not only a humiliating experience, but it was unsustainable. If Russia is indeed a weaker part in this dialogue, it can exert a negative control on many things in its neighborhood, and it can prevent the events from folding into a negative direction towards its interests by many tools. And this again will provoke the debate that Russia is a spoiler while it is just defensive.

So the talk about whether Russia is a declining power is a 20-year old. The most vivid example of it is in Jeffrey Taylor's article in *The Atlantic* 'Russia is finished. The unstoppable descent of a once great power into social catastrophe and strategic irrelevance'. When something is wrong with this, when Russia is not that declining, or it is declining but for some reason it is still doing something, it is another narrative – that Russia is resurgent. There always are some reasons why Russia is not good, even in the situations where Russia possibly is right – like in Georgia in 2008 or in Syria in 2014.

New Challenges and Strategic Dialogue

Having this sustainable perception – are we actually in the trend towards strategic dialogue? To my mind, this kind of narrative resembles the battles of the past – a Cold War thing, which may be very much to the liking of the elites here and there. But they are not dealing with the challenges we are in. It is a new era, it is not a Cold War anymore, the challenges are numerous. While during the Cold War threats were coming from powerful states, now threats are coming from the collapsed states, ungoverned regions, or asymmetric threats.

Imagine how a war of the 21st century can look like. Any regime, or government or a small group, which can have a very sophisticated IT, can hijack nuclear weapons, or disrupt the functioning of security infrastructure. The world is more dense today than it was throughout the Cold War, it is much more multipolar than it was previously. The United States is still an important country, it is a leader – there is no doubt. But it is not growing the way it used to in the second part of the 20th century. And security challenges to the United States are very different from what they were at that time. Since the United States have jumped from isolation to a superpower status, it is lacking the classical European diplomatic experience, when you have many wars with your neighbors and you learn how to negotiate with them afterwards. This experience helps to understand when exactly you should use force, but when it is better to negotiate.

This kind of experience Russia has. Russia and Turkey are champions in wars against each other – 12 wars – it is a world record. But for Russia the international environment is also very different, and probably much more different than for the United States. For the first time in 300 years Russia ceases to be the undisputable gravity center in Eurasia – competitors are numerous, influential and growing – China, EU, Turkey, Iran, the United States. Economic forecast for Russia is not promising. How to stay relevant in this situation, how to preserve achievements of the Russian experiment?

For Russia the main task is to recreate itself as a major power. For the United States it is to adapt its leadership in the changing world. So do we actually want to confront each other in this new world – is this a number one priority for us?

If we had a common interest of a new sustainable equilibrium, which would be inclusive and involve important and major players and which would help to sustain a complex balance on the planet, that would be a much more secure world that would be less prone to produce violence or crises. But that should include cordially taking into account vital interests of all the sides. And this arrangement should include the point that Russia sustains the Central Eurasia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and the United States is globally present and sustains complex balances with other major powers.

But I think that this scenario is less probable. The new norm – or letter B scenario, ‘leave things as they are, do not resume strategic dialogue, let things happen’. It is not a catastrophic scenario, but it is less optimistic, and I think it is more probable. It would take us a generation or maybe two until we reach an understanding that we need to talk. I think several more crises, not only in the CIS but elsewhere, for the United States – some more experience in wars and conflicts, successes and failures and then – understanding that you need to talk to people. For Russia it is preserving itself, remaining an important player in this geography is also a very challenging task.

Both sides think that the time is on their side. The United State thinks that Russia is declining so it does not need to hurry – Russia will collapse by itself. Russia thinks that the US is important, but they are self-defeating, committing a lot of mistakes, they might learn something but it will take time.

I submit that there will be no new resets in the next ten years. I think that the sanctions war will be sustained. The good thing is that the Cold War dynamic will be reduced, although it will remain. We have managed to avoid proxy wars so far, and hopefully these will not occur. No ideological struggle is taking place – Russia is not proposing any new version of communism, or anything of the kind. There have been a few spy scandals. Russia would still be excluded from the European security system, NATO would be the guarantor and we will have many frictions in the CIS, particularly in the Eastern flange and Georgia. The US missile defense would also be a point of major frictions. Again will recur argument about stability and democracy promotion – the US would feel very tempted to support young democracies everywhere disregarding what these people are about. But this “new norm” would still include occasional cooperation on issues of mutual interest, like Iran nuclear program, North Korea, possibly resource competition, the space, the Arctic, migration, etc.

Even though Russia is behind the US in many aspects – defense budget is about 8 times smaller, and after the ruble collapse I think it is about 15 times – still the cost of war for Russia is negligible comparing to the US experience. Its assistance to Syria, operations in South Ossetia, war in Afghanistan – while the US spends trillions of dollars, Russia spends about 100 times less, and this is due to the imbalances of economy and the fact that the Russian military works differently. The operations that it can perform it can sustain for a long time. This is the case for the Syria operation – it is like a very prolonged military exercise. So in this “new norm”, even if you perceive Russia as declining, it will still be very active militarily, and be a very important player in Eurasia.

In the long term, this scenario would lead us in 30 years to soft balancing between the West and, possibly, Russia-China-Eurasian Economic Union. But I think we are not doomed to this, and it

is possible that a joint strategic framework can be achieved if we resume clear discussion about what disturbs us with each other, and where are the points we can agree on.

And I do think that right now we have common interests in several vital spheres, and that includes strategic stability, prevention of spread of weapons of mass destruction, radical Islamism and global terrorism, stability in Eurasia – Afghanistan and Central Asia,- demographic challenges, future resource competition – in 100 years we will have around 10 billion of people, how will this change everything? There are few much more challenging tasks between us that we will probably never agree on, but a dialogue about them will help to avoid most urgent crises, like the Ukrainian one.

First and foremost, security system for Eurasia including and involving Russia, and particularly on Russia's borders. Another one is preventing emergence of ungovernable spaces, in the Middle East, Central Asia and also in the Caucasus, in Africa. This migration crisis, which had been forecasted by the Russian military and some other officials, is very challenging for European security and the EU as a political union. And it is not the last time we have this kind of crises. Demographic dynamic in poor and ungovernable parts of the world are very big, it can change the calculus elsewhere.

The debate about stability and democratic promotions is a historical one between Russia and the West, where the US believes that at any cost democracy should be brought to remote regions and once it is established all the other things will be working better. And Russia believes that while democracy is a good thing, but when you bring it by force and when you disrupt the equilibrium that existed there, you either need to forcefully input a new regime there and sustain it and maintain the stability at any cost. And this stability and democracy debate will be there for the future.

And the last thing - how can an inclusive global equilibrium look like? Will the United Nations be a sustainable institute to govern the world? How will the Security Council look like? Discussing kind of question with decent honesty and decent sophistication and complexity is an important way to form a strategic framework between Russia and the West, even though, I believe, we will still be adversaries.