We are proudly re-posting Nicole Grajewski´s article, originaly published on the Russia Matters website. Enjoy!
On Oct. 18, the U.N. conventional arms embargo on Iran will expire despite the Trump administration’s numerous attempts to extend the embargo and induce “snap back” provisions. Russia has made its categorical rejection of Washington’s efforts to keep Iran from resuming arms exports crystal clear; however, opposition to the extension of the embargo should not be mistaken as an indication that Moscow will rush to sell weapons to Tehran. Even though Moscow may possess commercial interests in exporting arms to Tehran, numerous financial, technical and political obstacles complicate Iran’s acquisition of Russian weapons and military equipment.
Moscow Unimpressed by Prospects of U.S. Sanctions as Iran Eyes Russian Systems
The state of U.S.-Russian relations suggests that Washington lacks the leverage or trust in Moscow to reach an understanding on limiting the sale of weapons to Tehran akin to previous instances of U.S.-Russian cooperation like the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement or U.N. Resolution 1929 and the S-300.
Washington’s preemptive formulation of unilateral sanctions under Executive Order 13949 to punish those who participate “in the supply, sale or transfer of conventional arms to or from Iran” has done little to dissuade Russia’s open proclamations about its commitment to cooperating with Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed the threat of U.S. sanctions and expressed Moscow’s intention to engage in arms sales and to continue close military cooperation with Tehran after the U.N. arms embargo expires on Oct. 18. Given existing U.S. sanctions on Russia’s defense industry, Executive Order 13949 is “simply not a threat” to Russian enterprises such as state arms exporter Rosoboronexport. Moreover, Russian opposition to the Trump administration’s efforts to extend the embargo also helps Moscow portray itself as a champion of international law amid increasing U.S. intransigence and unilateralism. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) included provisions that amended previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on Tehran as part of the agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program. Under the JCPOA, Resolution 2231 (2015) amended the conventional weapons ban on Iran to permit the sale of these weapons with U.N. Security Council approval for five years after the JCPOA adoption day, Oct. 18, 2015.
Following the expiration of the embargo, Iran will be able to purchase battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, warships and systems without the approval of the U.N. Security Council. In anticipation of the embargo’s expiration, an oft-cited 2019 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report speculated that Iran would purchase Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 trainers, T-90 tanks, S-400 surface to air missile defense systems and Bastion mobile coastal defense missile systems from Russia. Previously, there were reports that Iran provided Russia with a far more extensive list of weapons during then-Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehgan’s visit to Moscow in 2016. Since then, periodic appearances by Iranian defense officials at Russian weapons expos have fueled speculation that Iran may seek to secure advanced weapons systems such as the S-400. Iran has frequently identified the Su-30 and S-400 as highly coveted acquisitions, consistent with the country’s need to modernize its air force and strengthen its air defense capabilities. The Center for Strategic Research of Iran’s Expediency Council and the Tabyin Center for Strategic Studies have called for the procurement of fighter jets like the Su-30s and the S-400 defense systems to combat potential U.S. or Israeli strikes. However, many of these analyses published by the Iranian press and think-tanks tend to underplay the challenges associated with its prospective arms imports after Oct. 18. As stated above, there are multiple reasons why Iranians will not receive an influx of Russian weapons.
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