Corona Conversations #1: Perspectives on Russia in the Era of Pandemic

Moderator: Dr Julie Newton

Guests:

Prof. Rawi Abdelal

Dr Thomas Gomart

Dr Andrey Kortunov

Overview

Julie Newton: To what extent has the impact of the pandemic combined with the recent oil price shocks limited Russia´s capacity to act and hold its power position on the international stage?

Rawi Abdelal: It is well known that the Russian budget is highly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues. So oil and gas represent a point of connection between systemic factors and their domestic consequences in Russia. The current collapse in oil prices is more of a demand shock than a supply shock. But we are probably looking at a steady state of depressed prices for hydrocarbons, which is likely to last throughout most of 2021. This will filter down to the domestic level in Russia, depriving the government of revenues necessary to manage the domestic political economy and project power on the international stage.

Thomas Gomart: Let me describe briefly my understanding of this crisis: it is a techno-sanitary crisis in its causes, but technological in its consequences. We are facing two gaps: first is a gap between the number of dead people, which is still lower than in Syria for example, and economic measures taken to avoid more deaths. In my view, the economic measures taken in Russia have been less significant than in other European countries.

The second gap is between specific material needs to tackle the crisis, such as hospital beds and tests, and non-material platforms, including digital platforms, required to solve this crisis politically. The crisis increases the role of cyberspace and digital means of political management, with important implications for the future of European countries as well as Russia. Russia manages on the material front; its healthcare system may struggle but has not collapsed. But it is lagging behind on the digital front. Before the crisis, Russia could have been considered a member of the “Big Three” (US, China, Russia) in terms of digital development. But afterwards, there will likely be just “the Big Two” – the United States and China – which manage and shape changes on the digital front.

Andrey Kortunov: The impact of the pandemic is a moving target, and we are not yet even in the middle of the crisis. I think that the crisis has clearly demonstrated that Russia is not a Eurasian country, but a European one. The model of the pandemic was not that different from the experience of other European nations and clearly it was very different from how COVID was handled not only in China but also in other Asian countries. As for its impact, I think that the pandemic creates a lot of tactical openings for Russia as well as strategic challenges.

As for the openings, it is likely that all the major players will focus on their domestic issues creating a kind of power vacuum in the international arena, which Russia can possibly use to advance its agenda. Hopefully, even the current problems in the Russia-West relations may pale in the face of more profound challenges which we all face, opening space for some kind of mini-détente.

Nevertheless, the challenges are probably more serious. Russia, as an emerging economy, will be hit harder by this crisis than most of the developed nations. That will limit Russia´s ability to act abroad. In Russia, isolationism is on the rise, making it increasingly difficult to sell foreign-policy operations as a success without first addressing domestic socio-economic problems.

And if we are indeed heading towards the new bipolarity, it may be tactically good for Russia as it becomes more important for China as a partner, but strategically it would create serious constraints to the freedom to manoeuvre which the Russian government now enjoys.

Julie Newton: Let´s unpack the topic of China with you mentioned: how do you think this pandemic will affect Russia´s relations with China?

Rawi Abdelal: I agree with Thomas and Andrey that the nature of the system is beginning to revolve around Chinese-US relationship, and the main characteristic of this relationship, exacerbated by the pandemic, is currently deep rivalry and mistrust. This trend is long-term and seems semi-permanent, but everything that was going badly got worse during this crisis.

Simultaneously, it seems that every regime gets more self-absorbed, more focused on domestic issues. On the international level this calms down the potential appetite to influence what is going on in other countries. It also means that there cannot be a rapprochement between Russia and the West, as there is no ‘West’ anymore. The idea of the West was rooted in trans-Atlanticism, which is under such strain that it is more accurate today to speak of just ‘Europe’ and the ‘United States’, rather than ‘the West’.

Andrey Kortunov, replying to Rawi: I am probably slightly more optimistic about the West than that. I think it takes probably more than one American President to destroy it, and I wouldn´t be surprised to see a renaissance of it. I even think that China may become a consolidating factor.

But as for Russia, I agree that if it can consolidate its relations with part of the West, this part is not the United States. I even think that for Russia, unlike for most other countries, it does not matter much who wins the November elections in the US. Biden might be more willing to talk about strategic arms, but he will be more involved in Ukraine and human rights, so his presidency is unlikely to change the dynamic of US-Russia relations. However, if Europe becomes a more independent player, there are some opportunities for Russia to balance relations with China by putting more emphasis on Europe, and I know there are people in government thinking about this possibility. There are simply limitations on how far Russia can go with China.

Thomas Gomart, replying to Kortunov: I think there are two ways of analysing the Russian situation. If we look at it through the lens of oil, then Russia is still quite comfortable; but if we analyse things on the basis of the transformation of the world economy around the data sector, then Russia is in a less comfortable position.

I think that most of the diplomacy in the second half of the 20th century was shaped by the need for oil. It influences all the permanent members of the UNSC’s priorities in the Middle East. Except for Russia, which does not need oil and has real structural importance. For years to come, China and India will surely maintain their demand for oil and that is good news for Russia. On the other hand, this pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis are likely to accelerate energy transformation in Europe, which is not advantageous for Russia.

But current trends require us to look elsewhere, too. The world’s biggest companies are not oil and gas giants anymore, but tech-companies focused on data. We are witnessing a systemic economic restructuring from oil to data, and that will be difficult for Russia. Russia, despite having some highly specific skills and tools in this tech arena, cannot compare to the US and China in a data-driven economy.

Rawi Abdelal: The US oil-producing sector has been utterly devastated by the collapse of oil prices. The story of America’s energy autonomy is, in my view, no longer a part of the conversation about geopolitics.

On the economic side, there has been a massive fiscal response in the US to the pandemic and its aftermath, which brought mass unemployment. In Europe – Germany or Northern Europe – we will not see as much mass unemployment, since their response is largely focused on subsidizing wages. Russia is somewhere in-between – that is, asking companies to keep people on the payroll without subsiding wages very much, which basically means keeping people employed by bankrupting companies.

On the importance of the November elections for Russian domestic politics: I think it is important. The US is facing real risks of social disorder and constitutional crisis, as it is not clear that President Trump, if we have widespread remote-voting, will accept the outcome of the elections. This would potentially further damage the soft power of the US as a country capable of maintaining democratic institutions. And the Russian government is likely to narrate that.

Julie Newton: Leaving that possibility aside, do you think that a Democratic president could re-think and alter US-Russia relations?

Rawi Abdelal: Basically, no. One part of the transatlantic rift, which I would argue has little to do with President Trump, is the unilateral extra-territorial sanctions against countries like Russia—sanctions that European firms are obliged to follow if they want to access the US financial system. The sanctions also block improvement in Russia-US relations, since only Congress can remove or amend them, not the President, and there is no political will in Congress to do that.

Andrey Kortunov: I think that the history teaches us that change in Russia-US relations comes from a strong US President who can rely on domestic support. But whoever comes to power this November, he will be a relatively weak president of a very split country. I think that those who say it is good for us to have a weak American President only show their ignorance; it is bad for Russia, bad for Europe, and bad for China.

Julie Newton: How representative is the idea of rapprochement between Russian and Europe of the views in the Kremlin? And under what conditions could Russia reach out to Europe or make any concessions?

Andrey Kortunov: I think Russia has chosen a “wait-and-see” approach towards Europe. Europe is now going through profound changes, and the Kremlin feels it can wait for the results of those changes to determine whether they bring new openings. Russia would like to have a better relationship with Europe, but Moscow is not willing to pay the price that the Europeans would consider fair. Russia is not willing to make any concessions on issues important to Europe, like Libya, to show more creativity or flexibility, let alone in more controversial areas, such as Ukraine.

Moreover, despite our discussion about the trans-Atlantic rift, many people in Moscow believe that Europe is not, and never will be, an autonomous actor; that, at the end of the day, the Europeans will abide by the decisions made in Washington, as they did with the INF Treaty.

Thomas Gomart: There is still an important imbalance between the US and Russia. Russia is not the top foreign policy priority for the US, while the US is the priority for Russia. From the European perspective though, Russia is close to China, especially in the technological sphere, which informs the debates about 5G and so on. This positioning makes me rather sceptical about prospects for positive steps in Europe-Russia relations. Moreover, Russia is not the top priority for Europe; their priority is the economic relationship with China. There are two triangles, if you like – a strategic one between the US, China, and Russia, and a geo-economic one between China, Europe, and the US. This second triangle is much more important for the Europeans, even if the strategic one has some important consequences for Europe. And while Russians were explaining to us that the EU is nothing, that it is not important, the Chinese do the opposite; they claim they need a strong Europe which will balance the US in the geo-economic triangle. So, while Russia is important from the regional perspective, on the global level, it is not at the top of the European agenda. Rather, it is seen as something linked to China.

In fact, Brexit could change this atmosphere in the EU regarding Russia. And also, if this crisis has shown us something, it is that there is only one big country in Europe – and that is Germany. That means that the future of German-Russian relationship is the key to relations between Russia and Europe.

Julie Newton: Do you think this pandemic can encourage a more globalist agenda and more multilateral approach to international problems from the Kremlin’s side? And if so, what would be the main drivers of this?

Andrey Kortunov: My understanding is that people in Moscow are intrigued by the idea of multilateralism, but they don´t know how to use it. It would be a pragmatic approach for them, rather than a value-based one, because in some areas, Russia appears to be a weak or even marginal power. So, to protect its interests, it would be best to act more within multilateral frameworks and to form coalitions within international fora. But Russia so far has not really mastered the skills needed to be an efficient player in multilateral structures. Multilateralism is difficult for countries which emphasize their national sovereignty. The US is also not the best champion of multilateralism; nor is China, even if China tried.

Julie Newton: Thomas, I am interested in your view, as Europe certainly is a champion of multilateralism.

Thomas Gomart: Discussions which we have in Paris conclude that we will have a multipolar world without multilateralism, because multilateralism is attacked by the “Big Three”-- Russia, China and the US-- even if there is some space for many important countries like India, Australia and others, who don´t want to be trapped by a US-China rivalry that could reduce their freedom of action. As for the US and China, they can afford to be independent, as they are very strong, but for Russia, I never really understood their position. By weakening the Security Council by their consistent use of their veto power, they are paralyzing an important platform on which they have a say and are instead encouraging problem-solving outside the UN system, where Russia may not be able to influence the outcome.

Rawi Abdelal: I would add one other element which pushes in the same direction. Citizens within many countries have lost the ability to discern what is true and what is not true. This is manifested in international politics where nations are unable to agree on what is true and what is not true: there are competing epistemological frameworks, if you wish. Pandemics throughout history have tended to cause epistemological fragmentation and conspiracy theorizing. As a result, the lack of a shared ‘truth-space’ will become even more acute in the global politics. That makes some kinds of multilateralism effectively impossible.

I would add that Russia is in a unique position in this age of epistemological fragmentation, because there is not any other country in the world whose citizens would be so prone to conspiracy theorizing. Americans are catching up, but we have a long way to go before we get to Russian level of expertise in this area. Domestically, this is a real governance challenge going forward. While Kremlin had spent some years encouraging this fragmentation domestically, and also in the US, now it all seems to be getting rather out of hand.

Julie Newton: If we move to the domestic politics, I am interested whether you all believe that this pandemic will increase the shift away from international politics and towards domestic issues. Rawi already said yes, but I wonder what others think about this, especially in case of Russia.

Andrey Kortunov: I always believed there is a profound gap between what Russia wants and what Russia needs. The pandemic has shown that people are driven by their reflexes rather than by understanding of their interests. We all know that we need stronger international cooperation to handle this crisis, we need stronger UN, stronger WHO, but in reality, we instinctively go for isolationism and nationalism, and we rely on national governments even if they cannot solve the problems.

I hope that eventually interests will prevail over instincts and we will be back to some form of globalization, and that Russia will be part of this process. But Russians tend to see the outside world as a hostile place, where Russia is not welcome. While there may be some historical justifications to this approach, it does not solve problems. The outside world should be seen again not as a problem, but as an opportunity. Today, even when it comes to relations with Europe, there are no strong advocates who would lobby for more flexibility for improving the relations. So, the problem is not only strategic or economic, it is also a problem of human psychology and should be targeted as such.

Julie Newton: How can the fallout of the pandemic influence the social contract between the Russian regime and the society? Can the referendum on constitutional changes lead to any changes in this contract?

Andrey Kortunov: I think that the pandemic has accelerated the change which was already under way. The so called “Crimea consensus” – where citizens traded their economic prosperity for great-power status-- is crumbling; and an active foreign policy is no longer perceived as an asset, but as a liability. A big question is whether Putin´s regime will be able to replace this consensus with some new “Corona consensus” and position the president as a saviour not only from the pandemic, but also from the oil shocks and economic recession. I don’t think the referendum matters that much. What matters is whether the president and his team are able to come up with a narrative acceptable for majority of the population.

Rawi Abdelal: The point about a legitimating narrative is very important. There were two of them already: “we fixed a broken state”, and then: “having fixed the state, we are ready to turn Russia into a great power again”, and now, both of those stories are tired. I think what Andrey says – positioning the president as a saviour – is the only way forward for the regime. Nevertheless, the president has been remarkably absent from management of the crisis so far. The message seems to be: ‘we´ve built a highly centralized system, which is necessary both domestically and internationally, until we get the most severe health crisis of last one hundred years, at which point we are not in charge of it, but the local authorities are.’ So, it is going to be difficult to reinsert themselves into the narrative of the management of the pandemic.

Thomas Gomart: I want to add a point about leadership style. When we look at the countries with highest death rate from COVID, the US, Brazil, Russia, they have the same type of leaders who have this problematic relationship with what is truth. And we face it in Europe, too: leaders who say brutal, aggressive, untrue things just to make a show.

The absence of the leadership from President Putin is also understandable in this framework. It is easier to order the military than to save ordinary people, so handing the latter task to governors is convenient. But Russia proved to be resilient; its economy will not suffer too much, and I do not expect some deep changes in Russia related to this crisis. This is not case for Europe, but that is another question.