Corona Conversations 2021: Russia's Relations with the Non-West; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India

Moderator: Julie Newton

Guests: Rodric Braithwaite, Shamila Chaudary, Alexei Zakharov

Julie Newton: I would like to start with you Sir Rodric; many now talk about “the dawn of Eurasia”, by which they mean rise of this great network of states and institutions dominated by both Russia and China. The broad Greater Eurasian concept includes also countries of South Asia. So, in this context, what role does Russia envision for itself in the south Asian region? And to what extent do Russian political priorities align with those of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India?

Rodric Braithwaite: Well, the idea of Eurasia, as Mackinder’s idea of world-island, does not seem to be based on any concrete evidence. These ideas are attractive to various people in various times, but they are constructs; they are not real. Of course, we have to make generalizations to make sense of the world: the idea of bipolar confrontation is a perfect example. But that was a real confrontation based on ideological grounds and nuclear threat. But today’s confrontation is different. There is no ideological confrontation. Whatever people say about the decline of democracy and the rise of autocracy, this is much more like a competition which we had at the end of 19^th century than a cold-war type of confrontation.

President Putin has done a lot to revive Russian power, but the role of the second superpower has been already taken by China, and I do not think that is going to change. China will suffer setbacks, but there is no reason to think that it is going to collapse. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is able to compete also on the economic level and will continue so. Those who believe that China can be confined and put in place by the same methods which worked in case of the USSR, are living in an illusion.

At the same time, it is an illusion to think that we can write America off. The idea, popular in Russia and China, that democracy is in its inevitable decline is false or at least premature. America is still by far the strongest country in the world military and it is as entrepreneurial as ever.

So, in conclusion, of course Russia will resent and, where possible, challenge American power. Russia will develop its relationship with China as in many aspects it is their natural partner. But it will be a wary relationship, since Russians are probably aware that they need China more than China needs them. Russia also has many assets that it can use for South Asia. It has an obvious interest in balancing between Pakistan and India. I would be surprised if they decided to side too much with one or another. They have their interests in Afghanistan and to facilitate them, they will have to cooperate with most of Afghanistan’s neighbours across the region.

These Russian activities will no doubt be challenged by those on the ground, being it Indians, Pakistanis or Chinese. China regards itself as the preeminent power and it will not let Russia take that away from it. So, I do not think this is going to settle into some “greater Eurasian network”; I think it will be much more like the classic great power diplomacy of the 19^th century with shifting alliances and competing interests.

Julie Newton: Thank you for this sweeping introduction. That is an excellent way to get started. I would like to turn to Alexei to take on this broad question from a Russian perspective.

Alexei Zakharov: I would agree with Sir Rodric that Greater Eurasia remains rather a theoretical concept. Many Russian scholars tend to romanticize this geopolitical space by portraying it as a peaceful zone of partnership and stability. In reality, there are growing number of challenges and regional crises which make it difficult for Russia to balance its relations with regional partners.

I think that the original purpose of the Great Eurasia concept was to balance out Russian relations with the West after the crisis of 2014 and emphasize Russia’s pivot to the East. Also, Russia needs support from its regional partners to achieve its regional priorities and initiatives.

One of Russian priorities is balancing between the regional powers. Russia definitely wants the regional balance, for example between China and India, to remain stable. Even if Russia is forced to increasingly align with China, it is not interested in China emerging as the pre-eminent power in Russia’s neighbourhood. With this in mind, Russia prefers and encourages Indian influence in the region. In some areas, Russia can say that some of its initiatives have been successful and created some venue of fruitful discussion: such as, organizing Moscow format on Afghanistan. With this in mind, Russia tries to portray itself as a leader in regional issues with useful ties to many actors-- often even those who are in conflict with each other.

Julie Newton: Thank you that is great overview. Now, Shamila, what is your view of Russian objectives in the region?

Shamila Chaudhary: Let me start by saying that post-9/11, it has been a struggle for us in the DC to develop a vision for US policy all over the world. Wherever a terrorist threat appeared, it tended to dominate American vision for that region and South Asia is a victim of that. From this point of view, concepts like Greater Eurasia may look useful, as they should set some parameters of policy priorities. In reality, we know it does not work that way, having that construct does not, in fact, create boundaries; it can be aspirational at best.

At the same time, it is very useful in signalling. For the US to know that Russia has a vision and what some of Russia’s parameters for that vision are for South Asia is very useful information. Chinese and Russian interests and concerns about instability in the region are something the US has been processing and taking into account. I remember being in the Obama administration pre-bin Laden strike, and we wondered whether China and Russia should do more there, as it is their backyard, but we did not pay too much attention to these regional constructs, and we were too concerned with our own counterterrorist priorities there. From this point of view, it is almost helpful for the US when Russia and China articulate their vision of the region in some form.

At the same time, now, in the post-Afghanistan context, these regional constructs do not really matter. Everyone seems to be concerned with one thing which is instability in Afghanistan and that instability bleeding over into its own spaces. That applies to Russia, India, China as well as Pakistan, and the US, since instability in Afghanistan and potential terrorist threats can undermine their broader regional and even global strategies and priorities. So, I think a lot of work needs to be done between these countries to understand that we have some shared interests and where we diverge.

The United States needs to be very pragmatic about the Russians and the Chinese being in the region to stay and accept that they will have their own relations with Pakistan and India, which will not be exclusive. It has been the view in Washington that if the US has some relations with India, it cannot have certain type of relations with Pakistan, but absolutely you can! These countries have grown and matured, and although they still experience some fragility, they do not need to put all their eggs in one basket anymore. They are clear and very pragmatic in the sense that their connectivity needs to expand beyond single bilateral relationships and client dynamics. And when I see how Russia tries to deal with each of the countries in the region based on its own bilateral merits, I think we have a lot to learn from that in Washington.

Julie Newton: Thank you, Shamila. Your point that the US needs to start talking with many more countries is a very important one. Do you think that the mindset is shifting in the United States towards greater readiness to cooperate with India and Pakistan as well as with Russia and China in this region in a very pragmatic way?

Shamila Chaudhary: On a certain level, it is already happening. On the bureaucratic level, at the embassies, these relations certainly exist and there is this understanding that we have to learn from each other quite a bit. But on the strategic level, the level of regional and global vision, which Sir Rodric was talking about, I think it is completely absent.

The US worldview is now defined by China: what China wants and is China doing in that country, in that region or to the United States at home, and how it all translates into the domestic political situation in the United States. So, the strategic briefing of the US will really be defined by the perceptions of Chinese threat or Chinese behaviour and who in the US mind decides they are “with the US” or they are “with China”. In reality, no one really wants to do that, even the small countries who welcomed the Chinese, do not want to be too dependent on one “patron”.

The US’s lack of strategic vision and an articulated South Asia policy already limits our diplomatic capacity. Who is going to take us seriously when they know that this is the lowest issue in terms of our priority? If our worldview is defined by China, it is difficult to be taken seriously: we are not articulating any priorities, but yet we are participating in all these conversations on the regional and multilateral levels.

Julie Newton: Alexei, you mentioned that in Russia’s South Asia strategy, the role of India is mostly to balance China. I would like to ask this question in reverse: in Indian strategic thinking, what role does Russia play? And how is India responding to the increasing competition between United States and Russia for Indian political favour, both in economic and military terms? And last but not least, how do you see India dealing with growing challenges from China?

Alexei Zakharov: When we look at Indian views of Russia first, we have to realize that projecting into the Eurasian space has always been problematic for India. It is landlocked from the north by two adversaries, Pakistan and China. These problematic relations have been preventing India from establishing closer economic ties with many regional actors, including Central Asian republics. To interact with regional powers, such as Iran, India is always forced to search for alternative routes to develop ties. Unfortunately for India, the much talked-about project of international north-south corridor has not been implemented, so it really is quite difficult to effectively reach out to other countries in the region.

There were many voices in India pointing out that India was practically side-lined from the Afghan settlement. It was their connection to Russia and ability to interact with Russia, that allowed India to retain some influence over Afghan issue. For example, through the special mechanism for consultations with Russia, India was able to draw Central Asian republics into the conversation on Afghan affairs. It is interesting that when India attempted to host a regional dialogue on Afghanistan, it really invited just regional powers; the United States was not invited at all.

When it comes to Russia and Russian perceptions of the country, I would say India’s importance is growing but that it is mostly limited to several strategic areas. One of them is defence and arms trade: given the American sanctions against Russia, it was notable that India decided to go ahead with major military deals with Russia. Nevertheless, in the long-term perspective, India has been trying to diversify its sources of arms import and tackle its dependence on Russian military hardware, and Russia has been irritated by its diminishing share in Indian defence trade.

India tries to remain neutral when it comes to strained relations between Russia and the West and does not join in Western criticism of Russia vis-à-vis situation in Eastern Europe. I think that this Indian neutrality is important for Russia as there are not that many countries in the world which are ready to side with Russia, even if not vocally.

On growing Chinese influence: If we try to paint this picture in binary terms, then India is more likely to stand with the United States than with China. But India also tries not to stand against Russian interest, because for India, it is quite important to keep Russian neutrality when it comes to its growing rivalry with China. There are some scholars in India who suggest that Russia can have some leverage over Chinese policies in the region. Back in 2020, Russia appeared to be the only venue for India-China talks over their standoff in Himalayas. For India, it was also quite important that Russia kept supplying the military equipment even during the hot phase of this crisis. I heard many Indian officials underlining the importance of this gesture. But still, I would not overestimate Russia’s ability to act as a crisis manager between India and China. I think that beyond providing a venue for their talks, Russia cannot force the two sides to reconcile.

Rodric Brathwaite: If I may add just couple of comments: I think that, Shamila, you said that the Americans are beginning to accept that the Russians and the Chinese have their own concepts of what the region should look like. But my impression is that whether they accept their existence or not, they are actually not listening to them. I think the US still struggle to move from the position “this is the way it will be” [as dictated by the US], which they could afford in the past. And I very much agree that seeing the world in this binary fashion where the China issue colours everything else, is not a way you can run policy in 21^st century.

And for Russia and India, I believe it is interesting to look at previous history. India, for example, did not criticize the Soviet Union for its invasion to Hungary in 1956. India played a delicate balancing act during the Cold War as it had strong interests in keeping relations with both sides, and I would say similar calculations are valid for the Indians as well as for the Pakistanis today. Moreover, as Shamila said, nowadays these countries are much more aware of their ability to do their own foreign policy than they were in the past.

Julie Newton: To move on to Afghanistan, I would like to ask you Sir Rodric, about Russian views of the Taliban today. Obviously, these views have become much more complex. How does Russia’s contradictory approach to the Taliban affect its influence in Afghanistan?

Rodric Braithwaite: Well, as Shamila said, everybody has a contradictory approach to the Taliban, not only Russia. What strikes me is the extent to which the Russians kept up with what is going on in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until today. They have regarded the country as their major strategic interest for the same reasons as we do: as a source of possible terrorist threat and one which affects them much more geographically immediately than it affects us. So, I am not surprised that the Russians decided they will have to deal with the Taliban. As the Taliban establishes itself as a government of Afghanistan, we will all have to deal with it. And my personal view is that it is a disgrace on us that we are not dealing with it right now, given the humanitarian crisis unfolding there.

I assume that the Russians are keeping up with what is going on in Afghanistan and balancing their approach in a way we all do: they will go on considering how closely they can deal with the Taliban, because they have to, as it is the government now, and how they can effectively collaborate with other local players on the potential terrorist problem.

Julie Newton: Would you like to comment a bit more on the prospects of an unfolding humanitarian crisis and how Russia and China may respond to that?

Rodric Braithwaite: To be completely honest, I do not know how much money Russia feels it is able to invest into doing something about the humanitarian crisis. Russian aid, like everybody else’s aid, is usually inadequate and misdirected, and I do not think that Russia holds a key to this crisis. It will probably do something, it is in its interests, but I am not sure whether it can make all the difference. The key may be to release the money from Western banks, but that is not up to Russia to do.

Julie Newton: Shamila, can we talk a bit about Russian relations with Pakistan? They underwent a profound change since 2010 as both countries are looking for ways to cooperate with each other. I wonder, what is your assessment of the current state and the depth of the relationship. Also, why does Moscow seek to improve its relations with Pakistan, given the potential costs on Russo-Indian relations?

Shamila Chaudhary: My own family history relates to that. When Soviets invaded Afghanistan, my father concluded that Pakistan is their next stop and decided we would leave the country. And this fear that the Soviets would continue to Pakistan was widespread in the Pakistani diplomatic community at the time. Today, we are living in the period of very quick political change and fast adjustments of political alliances. This change in relations between Russia and Pakistan should be probably seen in this context. For this reason, I tend to take this rapprochement with just a grain of salt.

I think it is a beginning of a new phase of their relations where both sides are trying to get to know each other. There have been some joint military exercises and mil-to-mil [military-to-military] are always a strong place to start when building relations with Pakistan. I also think that Pakistan’s energy shortfall and need for energy infrastructure to be updated works in the relationship’s favour. Another useful platform for cooperation may be nuclear energy, and I think there is also certain amount of market opportunities. Russia also proved useful to Pakistan in the UN Security Council where it supported Pakistan when other countries wanted to label it is as a country that sponsors terrorism. That all will encourage more contacts and both countries will get to know each other better. At the same time, the relations are so new that it is difficult to see this change as permanent or dominant just yet.

Both countries have come together for couple of reasons that are more existential. Pakistani relations with the US are at a low point right now, so Pakistan wants countries like Russia in its corner, because it sends the message and helps to balance the US. As Russia-US relations are fraying as well, it has given only more zeitgeist to the Pakistanis to have the Russians on their side. The second big dynamic that is triggering this is the closer US-India cooperation.

At the same time, US-Pakistan relations have had their ups and downs, so even on this side nothing is necessarily permanent. There are some important strengths underpinning the relationship which are not going to go away. I think both countries are more connected than people give them credit for. But it is quite convenient for both sides at the moment not to talk about their ties too much in public.

Alexey Zakharov: I would just add that there are some changes in the multilateral cooperation which have some importance. I think that is has been quite painful for India that Russia has shifted its approach to some important issues on many multilateral platforms including the Security Council. For example, on Kashmir issue, compared to Cold War, Russia is not as supportive as it used to be. Russia has not blocked some initiatives drafted by China together with Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir issue. That is very sensitive to India and it creates strain and trust deficit in its relations with Russia.

I also think that Pakistan was very instrumental in relation to Russia’s outreach to the Taliban. It was one of the primary reasons Russia started to reach out to Pakistan ten years ago. And, indeed, at the beginning it seemed that their relationship would be based on security issues and it would not go beyond that. But we have seen some interest in economic and energy cooperation, as well.