Here is what our Fellows have to say:
Dmitry Tkach (Russia)
For Russia the process of ascertaining its own national identity and defining its status in the international community is a rather challenging task. The communist regime that came to power in the 20th century instilled a new ideology in the world views of the Soviets, ignoring or even discrediting the identity that had taken shape in the Russian Empire by that time. Thus, a fundamental gap arose between the mindsets of people before and after the Russian Revolution. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, a great range of communist values eventually faded into oblivion leaving after itself some sort of an “identity vacuum”.
In the 2000s, Vladimir Putin began to invest particular effort into reaffirming Russia’s great power status. Since 2006, Russia has been setting forth the goal of matching its foreign policy ambitions with its growing economic potential. In addition, Russia is striving to conceptualize the diversification of its foreign policy: a positive approach to globalization has been worked out; there has been a reassessment of the factors that are considered a threat to its national security; multilateral diplomacy is being promoted as a core mechanism of international relations. Such transformations respond to the evolutionary shift of world politics towards new dimensions – of economic, financial, technological interaction.
During this period, the Russian national idea, currently shaping, is becoming progressively inclusive of the aspiration to adopt a unique way of identity construction, of forming an authentic democratic system in Russia. It is this search for individuality in terms of positioning itself on the international arena and projecting certain values into the world that constitutes one of the most important objectives for Russia in the near future. Dwelling upon the role of ‘network diplomacy’ in modern global politics, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov underlined the increasing relevance of interest-oriented alliances with flexible geometry. Such a logic highlights the necessity to constantly look for clear and valid answers to the following questions: what are Russia’s national interests? What distinguishes them from the priorities of other countries? Around which of these interests can several states base their cooperation?
These are just some of the components of Russia’s value-focused foreign policy complex, which is being structured in close connection with the consolidation of public opinion: the supremacy of international law and a unified approach to its implementation; Russia’s authentic democratic system that should be acknowledged by the international community (this concept is becoming especially significant today when a greater number of political actors feel the urge to slow down the effects of globalization); polycentric configuration of the world order, as well as multilateralism consisting in the decisive contribution of international bodies, the United Nations included, to resolving disputes on the world stage; Russia’s multinationality and multiconfessionality that might present a distinctive development model amid the active large-scale adaptation to a novel multicultural environment; so-called conservative or traditional values, etc.
In order to further verify and fix its emerging identity, Russia’s foreign policy needs continuity, sustainability, and coherence. Three decades do not essentially appear to be a long enough period for identifying a qualitatively new yet comprehensive and self-sufficient international status. Today Russia must build upon the established foundations.
Sarah Calderone (United States)
The contention that building dialogue and rethinking divisions in Russia-West relations is left to an old book could be taken as pessimistic. But if it is true that this is due to a lack of common platform between the two sides’ ideas of rules-based and negotiative orders anyway, the assertion is an optimistic one. Further developed, it allows for an approach that deals with current realities and non-negotiable areas rather than expectations; to apply yet another metaphor, it pulls the car out of a parking space before moving onto a destination.
Continuing to get stuck on questions of order fails to acknowledge the dynamic nature of US-Russia relations in particular. We have already seen how Russia interacts with the rules-based international order. There is no guarantee of following those rules, as seen with actions in Ukraine. Now, with the current US administration, we could be seeing a preview to negotiative relations. But the recent return to rhetoric over spending on nuclear weapons shows how favorable negotiations are not guaranteed amid other political considerations.
This is where we can move from the theoretical to the practical, but only if it is something of interest to both sides. Assessing where these rules-based and negotiative approaches meet and diverge would be especially important in the case of US-Russia relations, but also in these so-called underperforming relationships, like with Europe, which probably comes closest to working with Russia in this way.
First, the issue of who is at the table is significant, and consideration of those elites and their interests needs to be expanded. This discussion has largely been out of bounds, while the current US administration is mostly treated as little more than an asterisk on the rules-based order. Refocusing on new issues is also important in determining pathways given the constraints of divergent approaches. Such areas also include nontraditional, cross-border security challenges like climate change, migration, and – now particularly relevant – public health. Of course, these issues are still politically contentious and may require the involvement of groups that until now have not interacted.
At the same time, however, the many references to small steps at last year’s conference from representatives of all regions were striking. But there was little expansion on those concepts mentioned, like facilitating everyday business, finding solutions to single issues with minimal results, and addressing the challenge of high politics blocking low-level issues. At times written off as efforts to simply maintain relations, such small victories could be what establish agreement as possible.
Again, this is all based on the interest of both states in developing such an approach, which is already present in other sectors like business, civil society, and education. Perhaps it is time for government to catch up, although this would require abandoning bravado, which is not anticipated from either side anytime soon. To extend the metaphor, there must be agreement on wanting to move the car; focusing on the way forward rather than the conclusion at least moves the car back and forth between obstacles before being able to pull away.
Claudia Westwood (United Kingdom)
In the closing remarks of the University Consortium conference, Dmitri Trenin delivered a concise assessment of Russia’s place in the world. He argued that the main threat to Russia is not from NATO or any outside actor but is from its own economic and technological weakness. In Russia, he contended “external security has been achieved, external status has been restored”, and now it is time to focus on domestic weaknesses. Russia needs to find and strengthen its identity and stand on its own in the world. In regards to relations with the US, he argues that we are not currently in a crisis, but an extended period of confrontation which has existed since 2014. Calls for dialogue ignore the lack of arena for this to take place. For Trenin, the US leads a Western, rules-based international order which Russia has no option but to submit to. Russia, too, has a distinct unwillingness to negotiate and tries to counter the US world order and create one in which the rules are decided with discussions between relevant actors. Given this international environment, Trenin suggests that Russia should shift its foreign policy to focus on collaborative areas such as technology and economic cooperation. In this piece, I seek to elaborate and comment on some of these points.
The most pressing threat to Russian domestic stability at the time being is its own weakness. Russia’s lack of economic diversification and reliance on oil and gas has long been acknowledged as a source of instability. The recent oil price war demonstrates clearly the risk of relying on the energy sector. However, rather than Russia’s place in the world being restored, I believe that Russia’s economic and technological weakness prevents the country from regaining the identity that it desires, that of a global power who offers an alternative world system to the rules-based US-led liberal world order. Trenin argues that Russia needs to find its international identity on the world stage. I argue that Russia has in fact already found the identity it desires, and rather than discover a new one, Russia needs revaluate this identity based on forthright assessments of current economic and political strength. Russia can enact a more cooperative foreign policy and domestic economic reforms that would allow it to gain the strength it needs and being a more meaningful actor on the world stage. This strategy is possible given Putin’s secure position in power but would be more effective if built in a positive manner rather than through the solely subversive actions the Russia seems to be prioritising presently. Russia can continue to combat the current international order through subversive actions, as it has been doing with the annexation of Crimea and interference in the US presidential election, but without extending a hand to countries with legitimate political cooperation, it will be difficult for Russia to establish itself as leader of a viable alternative world order and will most likely continue to be perceived mainly as a disruptive force. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to gain the legitimacy to offer a viable alternative without first building bridges with other nations (including Western ones). Engaging with partners like India and the EU would be an effective way of establishing this legitimacy, and would be an example of international rules being defined through negotiation between relevant actors. However, Russia’s response to the coronavirus pandemic of “international isolation” has highlighted its lack of willingness to progress in this area.
Trenin links US-Russian relations to their respective positions in the world order, and I would like to comment and expand on this thought. I agree with him that there is not currently a crisis in US-Russia relations, but rather a period of poor relations. While this period was sparked by a crisis in 2014, I argue peaks and troughs have been characteristic of the US-Russian relationship since the end of the Cold War, which can be seen in the so-called Bush, Clinton, Putin and Obama Resets. Low points in the relationship, from the 1990s onwards, were, I have argued, driven by US steps to establish the rules the current international order which were perceived as threatening Russian security. NATO expansion under Clinton and Bush is the key example of this. There has been a comprehensive failure to “normalise” relations between Russia and the US, in which both parties can be legitimately faulted. However, I argue that the reason that US-Russian relations have not normalised is due to the greater underlying factor that Russia’s problem is not with the current world order, but rather is with the fact that it is US-led. Here, it is important not to conflate the US and the liberal world order, although they are distinctly linked. The US while a key leader in the world order, has also in many instances undermined the key tenants of it, see the invasions of Iraq and Libya or the failure to sign the Rome Statute or the Kyoto Protocol. In recent years, we have seen Trump’s continued dismissal of international cooperation, as demonstrated by his recent defunding of the WHO, his withdrawal from the Paris Peace Accords and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and renegotiation of NAFTA (now USMCA). In these instances, where Russia and the US’s foreign policy goals were seemingly aligned in going against the world order, there has been little to no cooperation. A distinct lack of improvement in relations means this moment has rather proven that the core of Russia’s identity is based on challenging US hegemony rather than the world order. Furthermore, despite its own subversive actions, Russia criticises the US for not adhering to the rules it creates (see, for example, Putin on Iraq and Kosovo interventions). The most effective foreign policy going forward for Russia would not be overturning the system but rather maximising its position within it as the US retreats, which may eventually allow Russia some normative power. Withdrawal from the system brings Russia no closer to the identity it desires. Trenin argues that the US will have to revise its policies instead of fighting for an order which is shrinking, but I believe it is an opportunity for Russia to reflect on its possible role within a world order which is not shrinking but possibly losing a leader who was often ambivalent towards its protection.
Ia Tserodze (Georgia)
I was particularly intrigued by Dmitry Trenin’s focus on Russia’s internal struggles, claiming that external forces (or threats), NATO especially, should not be seen as worrisome for the country. This perspective is intriguing; I cannot help but wonder, however, how much of it is shared by other scholars and especially by Russian politicians currently holding power. I have heard from various Russian professors that the trick of foreign policy lies in uncovering its linkages to domestic policy – one cannot be discussed without the others. Russian leadership, as it is heavily perceived by the West, was threatened by the possibility of NATO’s expansion (back in 2007/early 2008), blocking Ukraine and Georgia from receiving Membership Actions Plans (MAPs). The prospect of external threats is believed to be the triggering factor of Russia’s desire to keep its neighbors in an unstable state, so that they are not “allowed” to fully integrate with entities such as NATO and the European Union (this theory seems to hold true with recent historical timelines, since the Georgia-Russo war began right after NATO’s 2008 April Bucharest Summit, and the war in Ukraine came after Euromaidan demonstrations, which were held in support of signing the Association Agreement).
I am curious to know if Dr. Trenin’s claims about external threats are in line with Russia’s approach to neighborhood instability. If Ukraine and Georgia were to join the ranks of NATO today, would he still feel that the organization is not worrisome? If the answer to this question is yes, then we are in agreement. As he mentioned later in his opening remarks, Russia should cease its intervention in the domestic affairs of other nation states. If Dr. Trenin’s emphasis on NATO and other external threats was made in good will, that is to say that the act of joining an organization should not be seen as a direct attack on Russia’s personal security, but rather as a basic right of a nation state (regardless of their geographic location) to choose their own trajectory, then I completely agree with him. I agree that Russia should focus on instability within its borders, rather than administer turmoil outside of its reach. However, if Dr. Trenin believes that external parties are not worrisome, because they will never overcome Russia’s efforts of instability in its neighboring nations, then Dr. Trenin and I might have to schedule another talk to further discuss our different perspectives.
Anna Ayvazyan (Russia)
From my view, Dmitry Trenin raises an important question about the need to strengthen Russia’s identity. It has been many years that Russia has been portrayed as the opponent of the West. There have been certain attempts from the Russian side to propose some ideational basis for cooperation with neighbouring countries, but so far it is articulated via the “being a friend” argument, which is rather outdated, given the ever-changing context of international relations. Russia tries to approach the post-Soviet space as a collective friendly community, but instead gets a rather unwelcome response: the crisis in Ukraine and in Georgia demonstrate that identity does play a role, and that is has undergone several stages and has transferred at some moment to something very different from what it was.
I would also argue that dividing lines are created precisely by using identity image. In case this image is perceived as an aggressive one, there can be no dialogue, and here I would agree with Dmitri. On the other hand, I think Russia could have developed a smart communication policy that would try to interact with Western ideas of the neoliberal world order and propose something different. Instead, what we see is that so far Russia mostly ignores normative discussion, stressing only pragmatic interests.
From my point of view, academic dialogue also matters a lot in this sense. The concepts and theories used by Russian international relations scholars and their European counterparts sometimes differ so drastically that they look like a different universe. At the same time, academics, opinion makers do play a role in Russia, I think, not only because they write analytical notes, reports, and strategy papers addressed to decision-makers. It is unfortunate that academic discussion about problematic issues of Russia and Western countries relations is becoming more and more polemical and not academically consistent and justified. I think this is something where academics could put in more effort.
I would like to end with a note on the possibility of dialogue: from my point of view, one should not underestimate the power of communication not only at higher political level, but also within societies. Statistics show that more that 70% Russian citizens do not have a foreign passport and have never been abroad. This means that when they speak about Europe or the collective West, they are mostly using information that they collect through mass media. In this sense, a European student travelling via a European voluntary exchange programme contributes to the dialogue mission no less than a high-level politician taking part in a formal discussion.
An American Fellow who wished to remain anonymous
In his opening remarks Dr. Trenin noted that, “Unfortunately we [in Russia] have an elite which lacks a sense of duty, and essentially is focused on their own little things.” I agree with his statement, but we must go a step further to characterize the elite’s effect on foreign policy. Academics and commentators in Moscow and Washington increasingly explain foreign policy through the lens of informal patronage networks which permeate the Kremlin, Putin’s cronies, and state-run enterprises. Together, the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests and informal patronage networks drive its foreign policy decisions and together they create an increasingly dangerous geopolitical environment.
Corrupt patronage networks are best demonstrated through the activities of the Wagner Group, a “private” military company active in the Middle East and Africa. Wagner Group operates through shell companies linked to Evgeny Prigozhin, a close Putin associate, and is used as an instrument of security exportation and private financial gain. In February 2018, while attempting to seize hydrocarbon fields for the Assad regime and Prigozhin’s shell company Евро Полис, Wagner Group initiated a firefight with US and Kurdish forces. The Russian military denied Wagner’s presence on the battlefield, resulting in the deaths of dozens of Russian contractors by US airstrikes.
This incident in eastern Syria demonstrates the dangerous nexus of private financial and geopolitical drivers in Russian foreign policy. Moscow has political interests in the continuity of Assad’s regime, but Putin’s cronies also stand to gain materially from the intervention. The Russian elite “focused on their own little things” escalated conflict between two nuclear powers. Corruption in Moscow has consequences abroad and the world is a more dangerous place because of it.
