Lukashenko and Tokaev – The price of being saved by the Kremlin

Abstract:

A war is raging in Europe, and Russia and the West are competing for global influence. Numerous consecutive Russian offensives, starting with the spring 2023 offensive, failed to lead to significant territorial changes. It is still worth exploring how a state that in the spring of 2020 arrested Wagner mercenaries, felt by February of 2022 compelled to offer its territory as a launching pad not just for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but also served as a staging ground for the very mercenaries it arrested two years before. This paper analyses the civil unrest in Belarus following the mismanaged presidential elections of 2020. It compares it with the upheaval in Kazakhstan in January 2022, when Kazakhstan's Tokaev invited Russian troops into his country. Unlike his Belarusian counterpart, he managed to expand his authority and safeguard his country's numerous ties with the West. At the same time, Lukashenko lost domestic authority and Belarus part of its international standing, at least in the West. It is worth comparing why these two cases developed so differently, because while they might seem like an eternity ago, it is only a question of time until the next beleaguered leader turns to the Kremlin for support. The structure of the receiving country's economy, the nature of the protests, and the type of aid supplied play a significant role in determining the long-term impact of the Kremlin's support. 

Introduction – the run-up to the crisis

Protests in Belarus began in May 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the run-up to the next sham presidential election in a country that has had the same president since 1994 and has not held free and fair elections since then.[i] In May 2020, video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky tried to run for president himself. Even though his chances of winning the election were very low, the government had him arrested, after which his wife announced that she would run in his stead.[ii] In the run-up to the elections, Lukashenko tried to rally people around himself and discredit the opposition. To this end, he even had a few dozen Russian mercenaries of the Wagner group arrested. Even though it is highly likely that the mercenaries were merely using Belarus for transit, Lukashenko attempted to portray himself as the sole person capable of navigating the delicate balance between the West and Russia, all the while peddling fears of a looming military intervention by the latter should a new, pro-Western government be elected.[iii] The alleged results, published on the evening of election day, August 9th, showed that 80% of the population voted for the incumbent.[iv]  Following this fraudulent vote, tens of thousands of people demonstrated for many months; on some days, hundreds of thousands of protesters were seen.

Public unrest in Kazakhstan had been growing for years. Most of the underlying drivers were economic, which continued to reach their peak on the eve of the unrest. Leading causes were substantial economic inequality, as evidenced by the fact that 0.001% of the population owned 55% of the country’s wealth, while 97% of the population owned less than $10,000. [v]  Dissatisfaction with inequality was compounded by the decline in real wages and the subsequent increase in poverty, further highlighting that the country's policies, despite being resource-rich, had failed to improve the livelihoods of the masses.[vi] The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the social decline of many people. The country was also suffering from an energy crisis that was partly co-created by crypto mining. Kazakhstan was the second-largest bitcoin mining country in the world, with many of these mines having connections to the surroundings of the former president.[vii] It was this very energy crisis that led to the government’s decision not to extend the natural gas subsidies, resulting in sudden and sharp price increases that served as the trigger for the subsequent unrest. Following the expiration of the fuel price cap on January 1, public unrest erupted in oil- and gas-rich regions of Western Kazakhstan and quickly spread throughout the country, including Almaty, the country’s largest city with a population of 1.8 million.[viii] The peaceful protests quickly turned violent, and Kazakh President Tokaev refused international calls for a negotiated settlement, calling the protestors criminals. These local and foreign bandits need to be destroyed while blaming independent media for fanning the unrest. Tokayev ultimately saw the necessity of calling upon CSTO peacekeeping troops. [ix]

The Russian government supported its beleaguered allies in Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, the character and scope of support varied significantly.

The struggle for language, media and narratives

Belarus and Russia share very close language ties that are arguably a consequence of Lukashenko's own state policies. While the importance of the Russian language decreased throughout the post-Soviet space, it gained significance in Belarus. According to the 2009 census,[x] ethnic Belarusians comprised approximately 84% of the population, with ethnic Russians making up another 8%. The dominance of the Russian language stems from the fact that 70% of ethnic Belarusians speak primarily Russian at home, while only 2% of ethnic Russians speak Belarusian at home. This trend is not new, and the percentage of ethnic Belarusians who speak Russian natively has increased from 14% in 1999 to 38% in 2019, with a similar trend observed in the language spoken at home. [xi] The dominance of the Russian language is further highlighted by the fact that the four most popular print media appear to publish predominantly in Russian.[xii] The same seems to be the case for the most popular TV channels.[xiii] A direct time comparison with Kazakhstan is challenging, as the Kazakh Bureau of National Statistics changed the language-related questions in its 1999, 2009, and 2021 censuses, making a direct comparison impossible. However, the 2009 version showed that 98.9% of ethnic Kazakhs and 98.8% of ethnic Russians speak their respective titular languages natively.[xiv] However, scholarly discourse shows that the role of the Russian language has been decreasing over the past decades. This is partly due to government policies, as well as the emigration and lower fertility rates of Russian and Russian-speaking ethnicities in Kazakhstan.[xv]

Lukashenko relied heavily on his control over the media. However, once the protests began, a few hundred employees of Belarusian state news outlets quit their jobs, and Belarusian state media were no longer able to perform their propaganda functions. As a response, Russian state media sent its people to Belarus in order to replace the functions of those who left their workplaces.[xvi] Lukashenko emphasised the importance of this aspect of Russian support by stating that it was essential for the continued operation of Belarusian state media.[xvii] Among the people replaced were IT specialists, correspondents, managers, journalists, and news writers. The Russian State News's ability to quickly facilitate hundreds of workers arguably boils down to relatively close language ties between the two countries.

In the case of Kazakhstan, the situation was very different. The government chose to limit the population’s access to information severely. The harshest measures included a nationwide and complete internet shut-off from January 5^th until January 10^th. However, partial shut-offs of internet, cable TV, and mobile phone services began earlier and persisted afterwards as well. The partial shutdowns, especially those targeting independent media and civil society, were particularly notable.[xviii] How the government implemented the shut-offs from a technical perspective is unclear. Still, there are indications that it was a concerted effort between the National Security Committee (intelligence agency) and internet providers. There are also indications of authoritarian learning, given that Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all engaged in internet shut-offs of varying scope in 2021, and Uzbekistan’s increasing use of the tool following the events in Kazakhstan.[xix] However, proof of direct technical support from Russia’s side can not be found. It appears that state media and its employees remained loyal and the government used them to sow confusion, spreading news about beheadings, mass rape and a foreign coup d’état attempt. The lack of internet made reporting on the ground challenging, with international observers relying mostly on Russian news outlets. Just like their Kazakhstani counterparts, they also did not convey a unified message, further contributing to the confusion. All of these aspects, combined with the silence of large parts of the national expert community, explain why it is still challenging to establish a reliable timeline of the events.[xx] There is no evidence to suggest that Russia replaced local staff in key industries, as it did in Belarus. It is unknown whether this lack of activity was due to a lack of ability, interest or need from the supply or demand side.

The national economy and state sovereignty

Lukashenko made Belarus highly dependent on Russian economic support. The foundation for the very high «normal level» of Russian support for Belarus can be found in the Union State treaties. Russia did not impose customs on the export of Russian energy resources to Belarus and provided the country with cheap credits. This allowed the Belarusian government to provide its citizens with affordable energy, refine part of the Russian crude, and resell it on the world market at much higher prices. In 2019, this made up 8% of Belarusian GDP.[xxi] Between 2005 and 2015, Russia supplied Belarus with over $ 100 billion worth of this kind of support. Belarussian GDP fluctuated during these years, but Russian support to the Belarus state budget amounted, on average, to approximately 20% of GDP.[xxii] General economic dependence increased further because Russian entities are by far the most significant foreign investors. Between 2010 and 2015, Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) accounted for between half and two-thirds of all FDI in Belarus.[xxiii]

Russia did not play a particularly active role in Kazakhstan, with its foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country consistently lagging behind that of the U.S., Germany, and Switzerland between 2012 and 2022.[xxiv] Russia is more important trade-wise. In 2021, Kazakhstan imported approximately two-thirds of its goods from Russia.[xxv] This is almost the ten-year average preceding the COVID-19 pandemic. [xxvi] However, there is an extreme imbalance in favour of Russia.[xxvii] The average yearly trade deficit between 2010 and 2021 was $8 billion, or approximately 4% of GDP, indicating that Kazakhstan imported 2.5 times more goods from Russia than it exported during that period.[xxviii] Therefore, Russia stands to lose much more than Kazakhstan should bilateral trade relations deteriorate due to geopolitical power play.

A significant problem for Lukashenko was the structure of Belarus's economy, one of the few in the post-Soviet space that had not fully transformed into a market economy. At the beginning of 2020, 43% of all employees worked in state enterprises. The Belarusian situation was exacerbated after the protests began and many people laid down their work at the state enterprises. Subsequently, a crucial source of income for the Belarusian state broke away. Interestingly, Russian financial support for Belarus did not increase significantly over the pre-crisis level.  While the Kremlin did extend a $1.5 billion credit to its counterpart in Minsk, at least part of that was intended to refinance existing loans. Another economic problem that came with the unrest was Western economic pressure. The U.S., the EU, Great Britain, Ukraine, and other Western countries imposed a wide variety of sanctions against Belarusian individuals, companies, and sectors of the industry, hoping to energise the protesters and lead to a loyalty shift among the elites, something that did not happen in the case of Kazakhstan. The sanctions against Belarus also targeted some companies in vital industries such as petroleum refining and chemical fertiliser production.[xxix] As more sanctions were introduced, the leadership of landlocked Belarus had little choice but to turn to its eastern neighbour to ensure access to international trade routes, financing, and other essential resources. The West did not punish Tokaev for his harsh response against the protestors, leaving Astana room to manoeuvre successfully between Russia and the West.

The leader, the elites, the masses and national control

During the protests, Lukashenko lost his crucial role as the indispensable actor he once was. His system ensured control over the elites due to a dual monopoly held by Lukashenko vis-à-vis Russia. Lukashenko controlled the decision-making process and personal links between Belarusian officials, elites, and their Russian counterparts.[xxx] This allowed him to control the distribution of the aforementioned Russian economic support. However, Lukashenko's weakness broke these monopolies. Links between Belarus’ KGB and Russia's FSB developed quickly.[xxxi] These new contacts made the Kremlin a viable alternative to Lukashenko, leading to his sidelining. Lukashenko also became less important for Belarusian companies, which started entering the Russian market directly once the West became an increasingly hostile environment.[xxxii] The Russian government also introduced direct, targeted support for Belarusian companies willing to engage in import substitution. This behaviour increased after the War in Ukraine started in 2022. The Russian ambassador to Minsk also visited Belarusian regions and important enterprises. In 2019, Minsk forced the Kremlin to recall its ambassador for the same behaviour, showing that Lukashenko lost much of his leverage vis-à-vis the Kremlin.[xxxiii] The progressive nature of these developments might indicate that Russia's role will continue to grow, further sidelining and replacing Lukashenko. This is especially true given that the constitutional reform, which initially promised to represent the new power dynamics within the country, failed to satisfy the national elites.[xxxiv]

It is interesting to observe that Russia’s strategy was very successful without the use of traditional force. While the Russian government prepared a reserve of security forces near the border, it does not appear that they were ever actually deployed into Belarus.^[xxxv]

Tokaev initially reacted to the deteriorating situation with concessions. However, after the protests continued to spread rapidly throughout the country and escalate even after prices were lowered below their starting point and the government resigned on January 4, Tokaev decided to initiate a show of force.[xxxvi] Public statements made by President Tokaev about 20 thousand foreign-trained terrorists were most likely overblown.[xxxvii]  However, Western media also reported about protestors in fighting gear and «groups of clearly trained people who came to fight».[xxxviii] On January 5, Tokaev leveraged the alleged foreign connection of these elements to call upon the CSTO to defend Kazakhstan against an external attack. The alliance granted this request.[xxxix] High levels of violence led to Tokaev issuing a «shoot to kill without warning»[xl] order on January 7 to the Kazakh forces. However, on January 19, all foreign troops had already left the country without firing a single shot.[xli]

The trigger for Kazakhstan differed from that of Belarus. While the unrest in the latter was primarily due to a stolen election, the unrest in the former was sparked by a price hike. However, the underlying problems were corruption, inequality, inflation, and the continued influence of former president Nazarbayev.[xlii] The thugs who turned the conflict violent were likely associates of clans loyal to the former president.[xliii] Once Tokaev made concessions, such as reintroducing the price cap or dismissing the government, these clans feared losing the privileges they had enjoyed for many years.[xliv] It is worth noting that the word 'clan' can be easily misunderstood. While anthropological elements play a role, clans in Kazakhstan, when used in a political context, refer more to political groups that follow a clan leader than to actual tribes. It should also be noted that people can belong to multiple political groups simultaneously, shift their loyalties and priorities between the different clans as they deem prudent.[xlv] In addition to these clans, Kazakhstan is home to three macro-units that constitute states within the state. They are the bureaucracy, the security services and the corporate sector. There are indications that the security services initially chose not to support Tokaev. This is illustrated by the fact that law enforcement and the army left Almaty and other cities on the night of January 5^th. Once it became clear that Russia would send troops to support the incumbent, many disloyal clans and the security apparatus shifted their loyalty towards Tokaev. Theoretically, this could have just been a strategy of Tokaev to allow for escalation and subsequent repression.[xlvi] However, the January 11 announcement of far-reaching security-sector reform, which limits the autonomy of the security services, indicates that the security establishment initially chose the “wrong” side in this conflict.[xlvii] However, the causality of these developments can only be assumed, rather than proven.

Tokaev emerged strengthened from the civil unrest. Family members of Nazarbayev lost influential positions in the national economy, he replaced his predecessor as chairman of the National Security Council, and the head of intelligence services, clan-head and and Nazarbayev loyalist Karim Masimov was placed under arrest and has since been convicted to 18 years in prison for high treason while the security apparatus overall seems to have shifted its loyalty towards the new president.[xlviii] Whether this was part of a negotiated settlement between Tokaev and Nazarbayev or part of a coup attempt and a subsequent purge is unknown. However, Tokaev has since rewritten the constitution and held early presidential elections. While it is unclear whether the reforms are merely a smokescreen, they appear to be sufficient to keep the population content.[xlix] Meanwhile, Russia also benefited from these events, despite the CSTO's official offer of support. The Kremlin was likely confident that Kazakh authorities could manage the situation themselves. This assumption would have been further corroborated by the fact that Tokaev only requested a very limited contingent. This allowed Russia to present itself as the most influential arbiter of conflicts in the post-Soviet space.[l] This image has, however, been damaged by Russia's relatively unsuccessful invasion of Ukraine, which started the following month and is still ongoing. It is also likely that the invasion and Western sanctions have bound significant Russian capabilities and resources, making the Kremlin more reliant on regional middle powers and limiting Russia’s ability to harness tangible benefits from its show of force and influence.

Conclusion

To conclude, during the first 25 years of his tenure, Lukashenko made Belarus heavily dependent on Russian financial support. For many years, he successfully countered the ensuing Russian political influence. However, during the 2020 unrest, he lost legitimacy among the people and control over the media scene. He failed to enforce control over the country's elites, who began circumventing him in favour of direct connections to Moscow. Resource-rich Kazakhstan never had the same dependence on continued Russian financial support, nor does it enjoy the same language or media ties. The protests in Kazakhstan were not directed against the president himself, but against the overbearing shadow of his predecessor and the patrimonial system of corruption and inequality that Nazarbayev established. Tokaev utilised the protests and implemented some of the protesters' demands, thereby increasing his legitimacy among the people. During a brief but crucial moment of uncertainty, he used the Russian troops to demonstrate strength to Nazarbayev loyalists and the wider elite. While the protests in Belarus led to Lukashenko losing legitimacy among the people and the elites, Tokaev managed to increase his legitimacy among the former and successfully consolidate the latter.

This paper demonstrates that the reasons for unrest, the country's underlying structures, and its long-term dependence on Russian aid are more significant than Moscow's short-term support during a political crisis. In some cases, a Russian military presence may be less detrimental than a civilian one. All of these factors should be taken into account when determining how to respond to political unrest. While the instinct to help a country's people is understandable, it should not be forgotten that ill-conceived policy measures might lead to a further deterioration of the situation for the local population and an increase in Moscow's influence worldwide.

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