Reflections on Russia-West Relations: A UC Fellow's Perspective (Part 3)

Mina Sumaadii offers the next in our ongoing series of responses to the current state of Russia-West relations, following her participation in the fourth UC Module at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).

Thinking strategically, where would you like to see Russia-West relations in the next decade and what steps would you propose to all sides to get there?

Considering the current state of affairs, my position can be summed up as being optimistic but at the same time prepared for all types of scenarios to unravel. In an ideal world, the relationship will move toward normalization. In practice, after numerous attempts to improve the relationship by previous generations it becomes more difficult to be positive. Especially, considering how short a decade can be from a historical perspective, and all the fluctuations the relationship went through in the past. While some propose dialogue, it seems that dialogue is not working when the gap between narratives is big. Thus, I no longer think that more dialogue will help.

It is often stressed that in dealing with Russia it is important to distinguish between rhetoric and actions. As a result, since words are becoming meaningless and real action is expected, the most important step in normalization should be taken by addressing the trigger of the recent rift - the annexation of Crimea. Unless Crimea is returned to Ukraine, it is difficult to expect any improvements in relations between Russia and the West. In the scenario where there is no progress about it in the next decade, the West can afford the wait and see approach and be passive, but the state of the Russian economy shows that it cannot afford to do so. However, there are a couple aspects that have a potential in setting patterns and opportunities in the development of the relationship in the next decade.

The first aspect is Russia’s search for alternative markets and partners with its pivot to the East. It is likely to be even more disappointing experience, since Asian partners have much more hierarchical systems of cooperation than Western partners. Hence, it is unlikely that Russia will find better deals in the East than it had in the West. The deals with China did not live up to initial high expectations.  Beyond China it is difficult to operate, since many of region’s markets are protectionist and raw resources from Russia will meet high levels of competition. China has a political interest in working with Russia, but countries in the Asia-Pacific have less incentive to select Russia as a source of raw materials. The only way is for Russia to considerably decrease prices, which will add problems of justifying the construction of infrastructure necessary for delivery. Economically, it is likely to get a worse deal than what a richer West with already existing infrastructure can offer. Moreover, to access Asian markets Russia would have to go through China, the emerging ‘center’ of the region. Despite the rhetoric of Sino-Russian friendship, China is not a benevolent partner and at this point its commercial interests will dominate. This would mean that in return it will require Russia to relax access to its own and the post-Soviet markets. Will Russia compromise and how much? The answer to this will shape Russia’s experience in the search for alternatives to the Western market.    

The second relevant aspect will be a change of leadership with elections in Russia. The elections will not mean immediate change, since with or without Putin it is the same political system with its dependence on oil. But as a minimum standard of diplomatic courtesy, there will be attempts to engage with the new leaders. Thus, the ‘wait and see’ approach of the West has a potential to change if the new Russian leadership takes actions and not just offers rhetoric. At the same time, Russia is becoming increasingly isolationist, yet the Eurasian Economic Union it promotes is unlikely to become a self-sufficient system in the nearest future. The union is more aspirational and does not deliver benefits to the Russian state other than symbolism. Therefore, considering this and problems in the pivot to the East, it suggests that the new leadership might be much more open to renewed relations with the West and might even reconsider its position on Crimea. Conveniently, this can be the point when the new government can blame it on the policy of the previous government. For the Western democracies, it can serve as a justification for renewed engagement with Russia.

A third contributing aspect is related to changing global environment. In the next decade, if the move toward post-hydrocarbon economy will accelerate, it will send signals to oil economies. Sooner or later Russia would have to re-consider its resource economy, and be more open to domestic reforms. Under the current dominance of rent-seeking, these reforms will have to be paralleled with political changes. This time, in view of the history of ‘democracy promotion’ and how it became the scape goat of failed liberalization, the West should avoid the Good Samaritan problem and let Russian people reform on their own. However, the West should maintain its reward system for reforming states. The EU can continue to encourage others by the positive examples such as visa liberalization with Georgia and Ukraine.

These are just some of the aspects that would play a role in the next decade, however, they are likely to be the most crucial ones. In my opinion, these are some ‘windows of opportunity’ for renewed cooperation that are more solid. Moreover, it can be seen from the aspects I’ve covered that the normalization of relations depends more on the developments in Russia rather than the West. Overall, the aspects may not seem positive, but a belief in some improvements in the relationship can already be considered optimistic given the circumstances they’ve reached. Consequently, I do not see a way for a positive and growing cooperation to materialize in the next decade, that might be too soon, but a likelihood of some cooperation in contrast to ‘nothing’ at the moment.