The UC Interview Series: Ambassador Petr Kolář

Ryan Comrie

Ryan Comrie is a 2021 graduate of Harvard College and the Harvard Davis Center's Regional Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia master’s program where he focused on economic development in Siberia, US-Russia relations, and defense policy. He is currently a student at the University of Michigan Law School, where he is researching the intersection of international law, foreign policy, and defense strategy. He is also a Lieutenant in the US Air Force. He hopes to one day work in diplomacy.

Ambassador Petr Kolář

Petr Kolář is a Senior Advisor at Squire Patton Boggs. He focuses his practice on commercial diplomacy and global government relations. He also serves as an Independent Advisor to President of the Czech Republic and served as an External Advisor for foreign and security policies to the Chairman of the Czech Senate. Before that, Petr held a number of positions in the Czech Foreign Service, including Head of Department, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for bilateral relations, advisor to President Václav Havel for European integration and the Balkans, and Ambassador to Sweden (1996-1998), Ireland (1999-2003), the US (2005-2010) and the Russian Federation (2010-2012). In 2013 he served as Director of Foreign Affairs for the PPF Group, where he primarily focused on Asia.

Past Experience: on the End of Cold War and Introducing the Czech Republic to the West and on Naivete in Relations to Russia

Ryan:                     Thank you very much, Petr, for taking the time to speak with me. To begin, I would like to go all the way back to the start of your career in the late 1980s. It is my understanding that you briefly left Czechoslovakia, with the plan to emigrate, but came back right before the Velvet Revolution.

Petr Kolář:           Yes, that was just a very stupid attempt, because I left alone without my family. I had to leave them in Czechoslovakia. I hoped that I could get them to Germany, to Western Germany, through the Red Cross. But our son got sick, so I decided to come back. We still had a plan to leave together – to Canada, or the United States through Germany or Austria. But then, thank God, the Velvet Revolution came, and we were an active part of it.

After the revolution, my life changed completely. I got my academic credentials and I started to work at the Institute of Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences, Czechoslovakia.  In 1991 one of my colleagues Vilém Prečan who came back from exile from Germany, organised a scholarship for me at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the United States. I spent some time in the US, working later with the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. Upon my return I was invited to spend a couple of months at the University of London Institute for Historical Research, in the UK.

Then an invitation came to work as a research fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute. I was glad I could finally take my family with me; I had two sons, nine and three years old at the time. We spent half a year in Oslo and when we came back there was no Czechoslovakia anymore, it had split into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia while we were gone.

Upon my return, I got a job at the Institute for International Relations, a think-tank of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After about three months, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered me my first position in diplomacy. I became the director of the Department for NGOs and Czechs Living Abroad in December of 1993. From there, I moved to the so called “3^rd territorial department”, which covered Eastern and Southern Europe, including the Soviet Union, the Balkans, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. That was quite stimulating, because all the wars, all the tensions in Europe were in my territory. That is how I started my diplomatic career. Overall, I spent over 20 years in the Czech diplomatic service.

Ryan:                     I would like to focus on that period, right around the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, when you were working both in Western Europe and in Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic. I am very curious, during that time, did you find that there were barriers to dialogue between the West and the East? What stereotypes of the West did you find true or not true, and did you find that people in the West had stereotypes of the former Communist Bloc?

Petr Kolář:            There were stereotypes, of course. In 1991, at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, I was introduced to my fellow scholars as Petr Kolar, from Yugoslovakia. It was an administrator introducing me, not anyone who would work in IR, so it was a bit of a funny example that people outside academia really had no clue what Czechoslovakia was. But then, I also noticed that there are these presumptions or some cliches. First of all, they called my part of Europe ‘Eastern.’ I was always saying: "No, I'm from Central Europe. I am Central European; I'm not Eastern. My country is a more western country than Austria”. But the response would be something like: “Yeah, well, you are from Eastern Europe. So, you had to be a commie.” But I was not a commie. I was fighting the commies. I did not like the regime, I hated it, I was trying to escape from it. That is one example of how we were perceived.

At the same time, I have to say, that there was great and genuine effort to help us, which was quite encouraging. We were indeed welcomed with open arms at that time, there were also many Americans and people from the UK, who came to Czechoslovakia to teach English. They were helping in many aspects to speed up our integration into the world of democracies. At that time, I had this great feeling that we were welcome and that we were a part of history, history which we were creating together with our Western partners.

Ryan:                     I would like to talk a bit more about how you worked with Western democratic countries during that period of integration. What role do you think people, such as yourself, who were working with the West, traveling between, and coming back to Czechoslovakia played in fuelling the revolution and the transition to democracy after. Do you think that the perceptions of the West that you and others brought back impacted the political feelings in Czechoslovakia at all? Or were those kind of pro-democracy feelings already there?

Petr Kolář:           Well, in my country, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, the atmosphere was great. There were a lot of expectations. People felt that finally, we were back as a part of the world where we belong, that those 40 years of communism and few years of Nazi occupation were just an exception. They were excited that we were a democratic country again, part of a civilization with the same values and same principles. In our case, what helped very much was that we had President Václav Havel. He was very much respected everywhere. People knew him, even if they did not know how to pronounce his name properly and called him “Vaklav”. People like Paul Newman, Susan Vega, and the Rolling Stones, they all wanted to have a picture with him. It was the total opposite of today, when it is politicians who want to have a picture with celebrities. Havel was sort of an icon of the democratic transition from totalitarian regime to a free society.

As a result, I would say that we were boxing above our weight category. The revolution in Czechoslovakia was presented as an example of a peaceful and successful transition. Even the split of the country from Czechoslovakia to two separate republics was done very peacefully and in a very civilised way, that was also used as an example how it could be done.

All this helped us to enjoy this image of a real democracy, a nation who can go through some dramatic changes, not only peacefully but with dignity. We were enjoying those days. And I felt personally like I was a part of something big, really, that I could be a part of creating a new history, new content, everything.

Ryan:                   The Czech Republic was, as you mentioned, leading the way in former Communist Bloc countries towards the process of democratisation and joining Western institutions. It was the first to join NATO along with Poland and Hungary in 1999, and then the EU in 2004. Do you think that this haste of integration was due more to an eagerness to adopt Western systems or to distance from Soviet and then Russian influence?

Petr Kolář:            Both, I would say both. But honestly speaking, it was not such an easy path into the organisations you mentioned. First, we were accepted by the OECD which was also important. But of course, our main targets were the European Union and NATO. It was good that NATO was first because it created a feeling that we were safe. That was also a signal for foreign investors that this space is good, safe, and secure for their money. Their investments together with the fact that we were on our way to the European Union were very helpful.

But not all our Western partners were thrilled by our ambitions. Sometimes I felt that we were seen as these poor relatives from the eastern parts of Europe, who would like to have a piece of the cake, which they do not deserve, because they did not contribute to baking it. We were explaining to our partners in the West that expansion is in their interest as well.

In 1996, I became ambassador to Sweden. Sweden joined the EU just prior to that. They were very helpful: they shared with us their experience from their negotiations with the European Union. But there was still this feeling, which was general, I am not speaking about Sweden, but generally that some influential people in the West thought that it was not a good idea for us to join. Some thought that we were not prepared, that we needed to work harder.  Others were worried it would irritate Russia and create another Iron Curtain.

But thank God, the United States was thinking strategically and helped us very much. Americans helped to present the accession process as a type of investment which promised high revenue. The reasoning was: “If we accept these new democracies, the space of freedom, democracy, stability, and prosperity would be wider, it will make everyone stronger.”  

Eventually, more and more people understood this logic, and as we know today, it was really a very smart approach. It indeed created a space of stability, democracy, and freedom, but it also brought enormous prosperity. A wealthier population can purchase more and as a result the joint market grows even bigger. Central Europeans were part of this process, together we were destroying barriers instead of creating them. And today we can all enjoy the benefits of a united Europe.

And do you know what happened? In the past, we were asking foreign investors to come and invest in our country. Today, we also have Czech businesspeople who are investing in the West. Czech companies are investing in France, the UK, the United States, building factories, employing people, paying taxes. Those poor relatives became members of the family and are now significantly contributing to our joint wellbeing. It is really a great success story. I think we, Central Europeans, can use this experience in the future, maybe with Ukraine, because we know how to do it.

Ryan:                     The Czech Republic was, as you point out, a successful example of democratic and economic transition. I'm curious if there was anything politically that you saw, which helped the government overcome some issues, which they did face in the 1990s, such as systemic corruption and previously weak democratic institutions.

Petr Kolář:           Of course, it was not easy. This process of complex transformation is always full of bumps and pitfalls, and we had them as well. We had to fight corruption. We had to build the institutions of the state, which are strong and stable. We had to build a totally different society, business, private market. We had to create space for the free press: both public and private media. The media was soon working as democratic watchdogs, hunting corrupt politicians. But well, there were problems, definitely.

When President Havel left his office and the new President Vaclav Klaus came to the Prague Castle, of course we could not say that everything was done. But looking at the overall picture, it was a great success. I believe that we were, at that time, clearly demonstrating that you can transform a totalitarian regime into a democratic one— with some pains and mistakes, but that it is doable. I believe that one of the reasons we were quite popular among our Western partners, and at the same time really hated in some other countries, like Cuba or Iran, was this success story. We were presenting and representing an example of a successful democratisation, which was done peacefully, without blood, without shooting, without hanging people.

During the process we had to adopt a lot of laws and bills. There were people who were part of the former communist nomenklatura who were not allowed to work in the state sector or participate in politics for some time, but they were free to do business. Paradoxically, some of them became billionaires and even politicians later on, like our former Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš. He was a member of the communist nomenklatura, but then became our first billionaire and eventually the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister. Now he is the leader of the strongest opposition party. This free society gave him a chance to participate and succeed in business as well as in politics.

Ryan:                     I would like to move into your role as an ambassador. Most ambassadors step into their role with long histories of established diplomatic relations. I am curious what challenges or opportunities you found in filling the role of an ambassador for a new nation, or at least a nation in a new situation, which was attempting to establish new diplomatic relations with the Western European states and the US where you were ambassador.

Petr Kolář:           I will speak only from my personal experience, because it is hard to generalise. I was very fortunate: I was always in one of those places where something was happening. When I became the Ambassador to Sweden, I was only 33. And as a young chap, I was perceived as a revolutionary, as the face of the new democracy. It felt like all doors were open for me which I of course tried to use as much as possible for my country.

At the same time, there were these “child illnesses,” when democracy was born, and even in the Foreign Service, we were learning. Not everything was rosy and beautiful, there were some complications and troubles. I remember for example, when I was the ambassador to Ireland, between 1999 and 2003, part of the Czech Roma community decided to emigrate to Ireland. They were first going to Canada and then they discovered Ireland which at that time had a booming economy, was called the Celtic Tiger, and was inviting people to come. As a result, I had to suddenly face a problem, which I did not expect. I was summoned by the Irish Minister of Justice who told me to stop this influx. I said that we cannot stop it, because these people are free citizens, they have the same rights to travel as anybody else. He responded that if this continued, Ireland would have to impose visas again. That would mean that our negotiations with the European Union, and our whole application process would stop. I objected that we cannot stop our people from traveling, but they can stop offering them vouchers for accommodation and money and inviting them and welcoming them. If it were not for that policy, we would probably be able to explain to our citizens that Ireland is not the paradise waiting for them, as this policy presents it to be. That was one of the conflicts I had to solve then.

At the same time, they held a referendum vote on the Treaty of Nice in Ireland. It failed first, and then they repeated it and it succeeded. I was asked by the Irish government, as a young ambassador with a charming wife and beautiful children, if I could participate in their campaign to persuade ordinary Irish people, especially on the western coast, that we are not a threat for their neutrality. And that was great! We had a chance to talk to ordinary people and to travel to small villages in Ireland.

All these things, good and bad, were part of our integration. We were all learning about each other: and as they learned about us and we learned about them, suddenly, we realised that we all are human beings, with the same goal, to live in a free, democratic, and prosperous world. But we had to find ways to explain it to ordinary people who had their own concerns, and we had to solve some problems during that process created by some naivete and some not very reasonable approaches. It was really a process of mutual learning and of gaining mutual understanding. Finally, it ended all well because we, as you know, entered the European Union.

Later, when I was Ambassador in the United States (2005-2010), there were many similar problems. I created a group of like-minded ambassadors from countries who were from the former Eastern bloc and were a part of NATO and the European Union. We wanted from the United States to get the same rights as the old members of the European Union. We were, for example, trying to achieve these visa waivers, which was for the old Europe quite natural, but for us a luxury. Individually, no one wanted to help us too much. I created a group of nine, from which Poland would eventually withdraw, because they thought that they could do it individually better, due to the huge Polish diaspora in the United States. Our group of eight worked together, and we achieved our goal. Poland did not. Here again, we had to work with the public, with journalists, with members of Congress, and with US Senators. And we were explaining things which are quite simple and natural, but I learned at that time that it is not enough to be right, you must also be persuasive. You must be able to persuade others that you are right, and that it is good for them as well, that your approach is something that is a win-win, that you are not asking for mercy, that you are offering something that is in their interests too. If you can work that way, then you can be successful.

Ryan:                     I think that is a very insightful message. And hopefully that is something that future leaders really take heart of. In addition to being an ambassador to Western European countries and the US, you also were the ambassador to Russia. And I would like to talk a bit about the time period from Obama’s reset policy through your tenure in Russia to 2012, when you stepped down from that role. In 2009, you spoke very optimistically in an interview on NPR, during the first Czech presidency in the EU, about Russia being an important partner to the EU. You have also spoken about the US policy of “reset” towards Russia. I am curious about the optimism at the time: do you think that if the US policy of reset had been more successful in establishing a partnership, it might have had any effect on preventing the last decade of aggressive Russian foreign policy? Or was such partnership, now looking back, even possible, and if so, what could we have done to make it work better?

Petr Kolář:           Honestly, I have to admit and confess that we were naive. There was a lot of wishful thinking.

We all wanted to have Russia as a partner. During that period, it was not only Western business, but there was also a lot of political investment done to really help them, to explain that it is better to build a free and democratic society, and that they do not need to perceive us as an enemy.

You could see that there was a belief that we could work together if we really showed our trust and interest. Germany (and actually all of Europe) became much more dependent on Russian fossil fuels. I believe that was one of the attempts to show that we were trusting them, because if you do not trust someone, you would not so easily become dependent on something that is at their disposal. But unfortunately, when I look back, I see all that as really naive.

All these efforts to persuade Russian leaders that we could be partners were probably perceived by them as our stupidity and weakness. I think now that we made several serious mistakes. First, even if now it is rather obvious, I think we did not realise at the time, during that period of so-called democratisation in Russia, that Russian leaders, all of them former communists, do not understand that democracy is first of all about the rule of law. For them, the whole transition was rather a way to become wealthier and mightier, and they abused it for their own personal purposes. So, while there were new oligarchs connected with politicians, ordinary people were not receiving their salaries properly. There were empty shelves in shops, and Russian people were suddenly feeling that they were somehow abandoned and cheated. As a result, what we were calling democratisation, they were calling “Dyermo-Kratization” and dyermo means in the Russian language, “shit.”

For ordinary people, the transition years were a time of chaos, disaster, and collapse of the state. And we somehow did not realise it. And then when Mr. Putin came after Yeltsin, we in the West were actually very hopeful. He is a guy who does not drink, who does not smoke, who is a judo sporting guy— we hoped that he could bring some order and stabilise the economic situation. So again, we did not see who that guy really was. But already by 1999, just before Yeltsin resigned, Putin, at that time Prime Minister, published an article on the website, I think of the Russian government office, where he summarised his vision of the new millennium. He described Russia as a country which must become a superpower again and which is obliged to lead because Western democracies are obsolete, and liberal democracy is corrupted, corroded, and has no chance to survive. He was openly speaking about Russia as a country which has a right to be a superpower. It is all easy to believe from today's perspective, it is even obvious that his vision, this new great Russia, was never, from the beginning, possible without Ukraine. But we did not want to see that. We wanted to believe that he is a partner with whom we can work. You may remember the first meeting between him and President George W. Bush. At the press conference President Bush said something along the lines of ‘I looked into his eyes, and I saw a good fellow I can work with.’ Madeleine Albright was at the time saying ‘well, when I look into his eyes, I see only a cold-blooded KGB agent.’ She was smarter than we were.

I think that at the beginning he was just consolidating power. He was pretending they had fair elections, and we wanted to believe in that. Our wishful thinking became even stronger.

Then the invasion of Georgia came in 2008. Earlier that year there was the Bucharest summit of NATO. The Georgian and Ukrainian delegations went there hoping that they would get the status of NATO candidate countries. But they left empty-handed because Western partners did not want to irritate Russia, they wanted first to explain in Moscow that this is not against Russian interests. It was mostly French and German diplomacy which was advocating that approach that we should say only that the door of NATO would remain open for these two countries and for others, but that they would not get any direct promise. Later the same year, Russia invaded Georgia. I think it was a clear indication that they perceived our approach as weakness, uncertainty, and a sort of appeasement.

And then, when the Russians invaded Georgia, President Obama as a newly elected president, came with the policy of reset. Again, we wanted to believe and hope that this gesture would be perceived in Russia as a gesture of trust and goodwill, as a signal that we can cooperate and that we are not enemies. Today I believe that we should have shown our muscles and fists at that time, not just offered a hand to cooperate. They had to have laughed in the Kremlin. I imagine them saying, ‘Oh, my God, they did it again, they are so stupid. They are real idiots.’

And what happened with the policy of reset? Its architect, Michael McFaul, became the US ambassador to Russia. He actually arrived one year after me. He authored this cooperative trust-building policy when he was working in the NSC, and yet, when he came to Russia he was, from the very first day, hammered and humiliated, and he eventually had to leave prematurely. He was not accepted there at all, and his mission proved very unsuccessful.

And then, of course, there came the annexation of Crimea. And, yet again, it provoked only completely impotent sanctions, which I believe only showed Russia that we were not ready to really stand for our values and our allies and partners. From this perspective the situation we have today in Ukraine is a direct result of that approach. Our naivety and our idealism were driven by our genuine desire to have Russia as a partner, and maybe in the future as an ally. But we were blind, we did not want to see the reality.

Ryan:                     A quote of yours from the 2009 NPR talk that I found memorable was that the ‘the future is not in building fences, there must remain a light at the end of the tunnel.’ Thinking from the Russian perspective, perhaps that light at the end of the tunnel was not strong enough, early enough, by 2008. Certainly, Russia showed that they did not believe in it when they invaded Georgia. But in the early 1990s, Russian leaders spoke of joining NATO, and were laughed at. So, I am curious if you think there ever really did exist a meaningful dialogue about Russia becoming a leader in the West or if the approach was always that Russia may join not as a leader, but only a follower.

Petr Kolář:           That is a big question. I believe that at that time we were playing a strange game. On one hand, we were trying to persuade Russia that we want to be partners, but at the same time we saw that it would not be easy. As a result, we were speaking two different languages, metaphorically. We were telling them: ‘guys, if you want to build democracy, and to build a serious state, you have to accept and adopt some rules, which are part of it, first of all the rule of law. If you are asking us to help and to invest, then you should also do your homework, because there are some principles you need to accept and follow.’ And that was something that they did not want to do. Their message was: ‘Let us cooperate, but at the same time, do not tell us what we have to do. Because we know what is best for us, we are Russians, and you do not understand us.’

From that point, I think that people who were trying to be friendly, like Bill Clinton, who tried to communicate and collaborate with Boris Yeltsin, started to see that it would not be possible for this country to become part of a society which is based on accepting and respecting a set of common rules. In Central Europe, we did make mistakes and have some troubles, but we were actually building a democratic system. In Russia, they were only pretending to build democracy; maybe they did not understand how it should be done, maybe they were only choosing those bits that were good for them. In any case, they were not actually seriously doing the things they should do to become members of the society of democratic countries. So, that was the game we were playing— we would like to have Russia, as a partner, even maybe inside of our institutions, but at the same time we knew they were not ready for it. And they were not helping us when we tried to advise them on how to become members of our society. Looking back now I think that we probably never were really serious about opening the door for Russia, because we knew that if Russia entered, it would destroy our structures, the European Union or NATO, from the inside, because they really did not understand or accept how it should work and operate.

At the same time, we wanted to keep them on track, we wanted to somehow cooperate with them. But for the Russian leaders it meant that we were not giving them what they wanted. When they demanded access and equal standing, we would tell them: ‘Okay, we will give you what you want, but there are some preconditions. You have to implement some measures.’ But the response was that we should not tell them what they should do. So, it was really a hard dance. As if we were dancing to different music.

Current Issues: Why Central Europeans Support Ukraine and How Mr Putin Is Making the West Stronger

Ryan:                     That is a great transition into thinking more present day. Obviously, we would like to imagine that the road towards a partnership still exists. But if Russia continues to speak a different language – dance to different music - as you said, is there a chance for partnership or must they in the future, in order to build that partnership, become submissive to Western institutions?

Petr Kolář:           I personally believe that Russia must be defeated. Once Russia will be defeated properly like Germany or Japan at the end of the World War Two, then we know that the United States or the Western world can turn its main enemies into crucial strategic partners and allies. But for such a change to happen, it must be defeated first, and Mr. Putin must be terribly defeated. Russia and the Russians would need to understand that the way they behave right now is wrong. And they must understand that there is a chance to live in a better world, and we are ready to cooperate and help them, but that they first have to accept the rules which are imperative in civil society; that there is no way to dance around this. And of course, they have to leave Ukraine, they have to pay a price for what they are doing in Ukraine.

Moreover, this is, I believe, from Mr. Putin’s point of view, also about time. He is very much counting on time and believing that we are not resilient enough and that we will grow tired of a long war. He hopes that there will be more and more politicians in the West saying publicly that they want to stop, that it has gone on too long, and it is too exhausting, that our economy is suffering, and that we should find some exit strategy for Russia. I think it is very dangerous. There should be no exit strategy for this Russia, for Putin's Russia. Putin’s Russia must be defeated. And when it happens, then we can look for the way to help Russia be powerful again.

At the same time, we live in the globalised world where we must also be aware that we are not the only players. For example, China is waiting to see what will happen with Russia - what the effect of this war would be for the Russian state and Russian society. I amm sure that China is very seriously and closely watching what is happening there, not only because of Taiwan and their appetite to have this island back, but also because of the war as such, and the ability of the West to support Ukraine and to support our principles and values. They are, I am sure, also preparing some scenarios of what to do with Russia if it fails.

We must be prepared, just as the Chinese are surely getting ready, for the case in which Russia is defeated. I would recommend everybody to read Vladimir Sorokin’s novels. For example, in his novel Telluria, Russia collapses and is divided into many succession states which are competing among themselves. When I asked Sorokin about his other book The Day of Oprichnik, if he wrote it as a warning, he answered that originally yes, but he is afraid that it is a prediction instead. I guess it is the same with Telluria.  Who knows what will happen, I have no crystal ball. But the problem is that it is too complex to simply ask what we in the West should do with Russia if we do not know how China would act and what they are planning. It is a serious game. I think we have to prepare our own scenarios for different possibilities. But I still believe that the only chance for us to establish or to try to create some partnership with Russia and to start to negotiate with Russia is after Russia is defeated.

Ryan:                     Now, the Czech Republic has been a member of NATO for over 20 years and the EU for over 15. I am curious for other countries in Europe which have not had quite as much success in forming strong democratic institutions, but yet seek to join these groups like the EU or NATO, if it might be possible to grant membership, even before all the requirements are met with the hope that that would help them foster stronger democratic institutions. Or if not, what might be done to preserve the light at the end of the tunnel to encourage them to develop strong democratic institutions?

Petr Kolář:           It is a hard question. I believe that it could be encouraging for them to be in these institutions. And we could maybe influence them a bit when they are inside. But it is not healthy for the EU and NATO to break down the criteria, which are important for all members. It could have some negative impact on the quality of those institutions. I would say that we need to help them as much as possible to be ready. We should insist that they really meet all the criteria, but we should not give them a long list of conditions to fulfil all on their own. We have to make it clear that we are here to work with them and help them do it.

Especially speaking about Ukraine before the war, I would say that they would have probably appreciated such an approach. I am not so sure about Serbia, for example, which is in a different situation. There I see some similarity with Hungary, for example: they would like to be part of the Western society, but at the same time, they want to have a good relationship with Putin’s Russia. And that is unfortunately not possible. There is a choice to be made. Ukraine made that choice already. It is clear that Ukraine wants to be part of the Western world, that they would like to be in the EU and NATO.

In the case of Ukraine, we need to let them know that we are really very much interested in letting them in, not like at the Bucharest summit in 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia learned from us that the door is open, but we have to first somehow satisfy and address Russian concerns about their membership. We cannot repeat anything like that. We have to tell them clearly that we are very much interested, but at the same time they must be ready. We must show that that we want to be very much engaged in their accession process; that we will provide knowledge and experience and our experts. The message should be not only that we would like to have them in, but they must be willing to do their homework to meet the institutional requirements, and that we will help them to do so as a partner.

Ryan:                     That makes a lot of sense, the leaders of these institutions must send a strong signal to perspective members that they must be willing to engage but also that we will equally engage.

Petr Kolář:           We have to be partners. We are not just like a teacher in the school, who is telling the pupils to do their homework, and then leaves them to do it alone. We should tell them that we are ready to help them with that homework.

Ryan:                     In the campaign before the Czech presidential elections in January, the issue of the war in Ukraine became one of the main themes discussed. What does that debate tell us about the Czech attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia? And how have they evolved as a result? Are there any broader lessons for Central Europe or the EU to draw from the focus on those issues in the Czech presidential election?

Petr Kolář:           Well, the war became our domestic issue. Not only because we have about 400,000 Ukrainians here in a country of 10 and a half million as a result of the massive refugee wave, but it is also the question of the principle. How should we perceive and react when a country which was granted sovereignty by international law is attacked – that is a question of principle. Ukrainian territorial integrity was guaranteed by some main actors, including Russia. The Russian Federation is a signatory of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and even has a bilateral treaty with Ukraine from 1997 which was signed and approved by the Russian parliament. All these guarantees were given to Ukraine.  The Czech public found a historical parallel between what happened to Ukraine with Russia with what happened to Czechoslovakia in 1938 in Munich. From the Czech perspective, we feel that we were abandoned by our allies, France and Britain. We know that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Daladier were not ready to fight, to enter the war with Germany and Italy because of Czechoslovakia. And Czechs still have that trauma somewhere inside of our minds, and hearts. And I think that it was one of the reasons why we are firmly supporting Ukraine today.  Not everyone is decisively on the Ukrainian side, because the society was quite divided during the presidential race. But most of the society, thank God, saw that historical parallel and knew where to stand.

Moreover, luckily, before the war happened, we also had parliamentary elections. Now we have a coalition government which is clearly pro-Western, and which is very much in favour of our NATO and EU membership and our NATO commitments. I can hardly imagine that we would be in the same position if we had the previous government here with the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. He is above all a populist and would, probably, not so strongly and clearly support Ukraine when the society is to some extent split on the issue.
 

So, we have historical reasons to support Ukraine, and at the same time, we have a government which is pro-Western, and which is clearly standing by Ukraine. Supporting the Ukrainian cause is something that makes me, and I believe a lot of my fellow citizens too, proud.  I see that my country is on the frontline of those who are supporting Ukraine: accepting war refugees, sending weapons to Ukraine, supporting Ukraine politically, with no doubt, and it feels great. But I do not know if it is for granted. If current opposition parties were to form the government, it could change. But hopefully, the majority of our public, our people, would stand by Ukraine, even in that case.

Ryan:                     I think, very much like you said in your answer to the previous question, about the Czech Republic's need to assert their beliefs, the Czech Republic has taken a very strong role in supporting Ukraine even on the international stage.

Petr Kolář:           The fact that we are one of the countries which is persuading others to be more active and to be more supportive, is great. Let me give you an example: the Czech Prime Minister was immediately trying to, I mean in a positive way, influence his German partner. And indeed, Germany is now in a much stronger and better position than it was at the beginning of the war. And I think it is in some part a result of our influence, if not directly, then through our work in the EU.

We held the European presidency in the second half of 2022. During those six months there was a very good mood and atmosphere among our allies. The Czech Republic was a peer supporter and leader of that. The Presidential country is not meant to push its own political agenda, but we saw support of Ukraine as our collective European political agenda. We did our best during our presidency to promote that positive, collaborative mood not as our Czech priority but as the priority of the whole EU, and we knew for the reasons mentioned above that we should do it. It is a pity that the United Kingdom is not in the EU anymore, because it would be even better. But we can use British influence inside of NATO even if it is not in the European Union, and I believe that our countries cooperate effectively now.

Ryan:                     The timing of Brexit is rather unfortunate, given the need for a unified Europe now more than ever.

Petr Kolář:           Yes, that is right! But it is an achievement of Mr. Putin, that he has united us better than we could do without him. He has achieved a lot of things like bringing Finland to NATO, and Sweden will join us soon.

Ryan:                     In a way Putin has written his own worst nightmare.

Petr Kolář:           Yes. Mr. Putin makes us stronger.

Message to the Younger Generation:

Ryan:                     In the interest of time, I would like to move to a few final questions about advice or a message that you might have to students in the UC or broader who are interested in diplomacy or international studies. I think a great way to start that is to ask, if you were just now starting in your career in 2023, would you again pursue a career as a diplomat and in international studies?

Petr Kolář:           Oh, yes. Now, it is quite exciting to see what is happening with the world. And I believe that for young people, it is a great chance to be part of many historical moments. I had a feeling that I was part of building a new democratic diplomatic service in the early ‘90s. Now, the world has changed so much, and we have to adjust to these changes.

For example, what to do with the United Nations? Do we really need the United Nations with a Security Council where Russia has a veto? And China, of course, too. Just now (at the time of the interview) Russia is presiding over the Security Council, while it is invading another country. It is crazy. And of course, we must be thinking about the international order broadly. Is it enough to have the European Union and NATO? Or should we speak about wider family of democratic nations? What about Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and some others? Should we not stick together more and better to face these threats which are created by Russia, and also now by China? Should we not think about new arrangements, or a different world order? Is it possible?

I would say that, for young students who are thinking about a career and future in diplomacy and international relations, this is quite an exciting and challenging time. And yes, I would probably go for it, if I were graduating today.

Ryan:                     In your career, you have had great success as a diplomat serving as an ambassador to four rather different nations, and then also in the business world, and most recently in politics. So, I'm curious, what qualifications or traits or secrets to success have you found best helped you to both gain those roles and also to make you successful at them?

Petr Kolář:           Well, I believe that everybody who wants to be successful in international relations first must be well educated. You have to take education as a never-ending story - you have to study all the time. And as the world is changing, you must adapt to it.

Second, I believe that is very important to understand different cultures and different nations. I learned to understand that international relations are very much about psychology and empathy, but also, that diplomacy is not only about nice words, about pleasing your partner, but sometimes also about showing the muscles. I amm not saying that everybody needs to act as Richard Holbrook in Dayton, who made himself a name for being very harsh with the negotiating parties, but sometimes it is important to show that as diplomats we are not only gentle people, but also that we can clearly and strongly support our principles. And if those who act as our enemies do not want to understand it, we are ready to even use force to defend those principles.

This is where we are now with Russia, I believe. We were too gentle and too cautious to defend our position firmly. We were always trying to somehow please them and to find a compromise. And I think that they were just laughing at us thinking that we are not able to defend our interests and our values and principles. I think that this is why they believe liberal democracy is corroded, corrupted, led by different divisions; because we were never willing to stand for it. There is a balance between being gentle in diplomacy and knowing when to stand for your principles.

And thinking about it, what was also a very important factor in my diplomatic successes was that I realised that it is not enough to be right, you must also be persuasive. You must be able to create coalitions. If you are alone, you usually do not achieve your goal. You must find possible partners and allies and persuade them to cooperate and convince them that your approach is the right approach that is the key to success. It is also important to show them why your approach benefits them. So, my advice would be: join forces to do things with partners and allies.

Ryan:                     I think that is a great piece of advice to end on. Thank you very much for taking the time to speak with me and answer my questions.