Winner of the 2022 UC Essay Contest
Thomas Brewis
Dear all, we are happy to publish the winning essay of the 2022 UC Essay Contest.
For his essay, Tom chose to tackle following question from our list:
What did the Russian government and Russian policy experts have to say about NATO membership expansion before and after 1999 and 2004? How was the process understood within Russia and what were its perceived implications for the future, as seen during that time?
Enjoy!
Author's note: I write this on the Polish/Ukrainian border where I have been supporting the relocation of refugees. Many refugees have shared tragic stories of lost homes and abandoned lives but, often the greatest source of confusion and despair is their cruel treatment by Russians - soldiers, media and ordinary people alike. The paranoia, Occidentalism, bigotry and ressentiment now mainstream in Russian politics finds much of its origins in the period discussed in the essay and, many Russianists (including myself) have at times downplayed, rationalised and excused this rhetoric and worldview. It is vital that any future scholarship of Russia be done with this mistake in mind.
Introduction
Among the mourners who attended the funeral of Vladimir Zhirinovsky on the 8th of April 2022 were Russian President Vladimir Putin, Defence Minister Shoigu and a litany of other Russian foreign policy elites. A member of the ‘fake opposition’, Zhirinovsky’s aggressive and unhinged rants ensured that he spent much of his political career subject to online mockery. In the final years of his life however, state-run media lionised him for his career-long views on NATO and Ukraine, describing him as a visionary (HCH 2022). In 2000 he commented that ‘If we don’t solve the problem of NATO enlargement properly, then it is possibly the end of Russia in general’ (Kosals 2001). Once marginal, this view that NATO is now an existential threat to Russia is today mainstream in Russian society (Levada Centre 2022). However, while Zhirinovsky and his views on NATO stayed the same throughout his political career, the views of other leading Russian political figures changed dramatically. In 2004 Putin begrudgingly accepted the expansion of NATO and in 2005 Lavrov stated that Ukraine as a sovereign state had the right to choose a path to NATO (Lavrov 2005). In contrast in 2007, Putin claimed that ‘NATO expansion… represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’ (Putin 2007). A year later Russia would invade Georgia and in 2022 invade Ukraine with a casus belli based in part on preventing Ukraine from joining NATO.
This essay will attempt to understand how the Russian views of NATO expansion have changed over time and if the 1999 and 2004 NATO expansions can be viewed as turning or inflection points for Russian foreign policy, or if views and opinions changed because of other reasons.
To do this, this essay will make use of a discourse analysis of Russian presidential speeches and statements as well as elite and popular opinions polls and surveys. This essay will argue that the NATO expansions, both in 1999 and 2004, were not events that produced large changes in Russian foreign policy thinking. These expansions were known in advance and a consensus against the expansion of NATO had already emerged in the 1990s. Instead, this essay will argue that the makeup, interest and priorities of Russian elites have been key in determining Russian foreign policy attitudes. The 1999 expansion agitated hard-line members of the Russian security establishment and caused public backlash. However, the financial interests of Russia’s elite at the time required good relations with Western countries, and additionally more focus was put on Russia’s relationship with Asia and the restoration of control over the Caucuses.
Similarly, Russia begrudgingly accepted the 2004 NATO expansion. However, Russian attitudes towards NATO hardened significantly and became increasingly conspiratorial between 2004-2008 with grim implications for nations such as Ukraine and Georgia. This was only partly a reaction to NATO expansion which had been common knowledge since 2002 (with the Baltic countries in particular having stated a desire to join NATO for a decade, turning down a Russian compromise in 1995) (Banka 2019). Instead, it was due to a change in the Russian elite, with the Siloviki who had always believed that NATO was a threat to Russia displacing the last reformers of the 1990s. Their occidentalist and anti-NATO beliefs metastasized within Russian media and broader society between 2004-8, catalysed by the surprise revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. These popular uprisings were considered a threat to the Russian security elite. Therefore, a key Russian objective since 2004 has been the creation of instability on Russia's terms in Georgia and Ukraine rather than direct confrontation with NATO or prospective members.
A number of scholars have argued that either great power theory or historical insecurity are the best lenses with which to analyse Russian foreign policy (Graham 2010). Instead, this essay will argue that elite theory, which states that government policies and actions are designed to benefit a minority of the population who control key positions and resources, serves as a better way of explaining the evolution of Russian foreign policy. Foreign policy in general is seen as an area dominated by economic and policy elites compared to other policy areas (Gliens 2014). This is due to the amount of resources available to elites in this policy area and its remoteness from the median citizen. Additionally, Russia remains one of the world's most elitist and unequal countries in terms of distribution of resources and has historically been dominated by narrow elite groups who have used extreme violence to maintain control of the population and key resources for their own personal benefit (Kenan 1946). While a variety of opinions and perspectives on political issues exist within Russia to influence policy, these views need the backing of key factions and personnel within the Kremlin to gain traction (Zygar 2017). Therefore, this essay will make use of a Weberian analysis of elites that suggests that elite groups can be characterised by their level of ideological unity, ability to hold key positions and the ownership of key resources. However, while this may show how ideas are turned into policy, this essay will also look at the internal culture and worldviews of these elites to understand how these ideas are formed and spread widely across society.
Reformers and the Siloviki
While there are numerous elite groups and sub elite groups within Russia, the two which bitterly fought for control of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s were the Siloviki and the reformers. Reformers were an incoherent group of intellectuals, newly minted oligarchs and reform-minded politicians brought together just after the collapse of the USSR. Their goals were the shrinking the state and integrating Russia into the West (Rutland 2013). These goals immediately put them into conflict with the Siloviki. While the reformers worked to privatise and reduce the power of the Russian state, the Siloviki desired the opposite: the enlargement of the state and its leaders through the securitisation of society and the creation of numerous state and quasi-state security structures (Brenner 2007). Positive relations with the West were seen as an ideological and economic necessity and reformers were quick to encourage Yeltsin to patch up relations with the West after troubles emerged (Black 2002). Throughout the 1990s the behind-the-scenes conflict between reformers and the Siloviki led to a confusing foreign policy whereby every pro-NATO or pro-Western decision by a reformer would be countered by an anti-NATO speech or tirade endorsed by a member of the security apparatus (Siharulidze 2001). By the mid-2000s, few reformers retained high office posts, and a lack of leadership and unity made the group increasingly irrelevant. The removal of this pro-Western group not only created a situation where there were limited incentives to work with and repair relationships with the West (Zygar 2017), but also allowed another elite group to dominate politics.
The Siloviki, defined narrowly as those with a background in the intelligence services or more broadly as those with military backgrounds, are essential to understanding the shift in Russia’s attitude towards NATO around the time of its 2004 expansion (Kryshtanovskaya 2007). While considerable research has been done on Russian oligarchs (some of whom are also siloviki), the assets, political links and internal culture of the Siloviki are in comparison under researched despite the extent to which Silovik culture has permeated Russian politics and society (Bremmer 2007, 84).
What research that has been done on the siloviki has identified two defining characteristics of the group. The first is an ‘omerta’ or mafia code of hierarchy, clans and silence. This closed network creates a high level of insularity within the group as many members believe that their backgrounds make them superior to non-Siloviks (Dewisha 2011).
The second defining feature of the group is its penchant for conspiracy theories, identifying threats and a belief in Russian uniqueness. Many of these theories are vulgar and have explicit racist, antisemitic or sexist overtones and often involve diverse foreign agents working to destroy the Russian state or way of life through clandestine means and domestic agents seeking to ‘stab Russia in the back’. This, analogous to Hofstadter’s (1964) paranoid style of American politics, creates a grand narrative of Russia defending itself from a plethora of seen and unseen enemies; being strong while at the same time vulnerable (Lapidus 2007, 139). Evidence for these theories is often manufactured after the fact but nonetheless becomes accepted wisdom, firstly within Silovik circles, and then in wider Russian society. For example, Georgy Rogozin, a Major General in the 1990s who dabbled in the occult claimed to be able to read the mind of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright through telepathy. He claimed that the US was planning to take the Far East from Russia. In 2015 the Head of the Russian National Security Council Patrushev repeated these claims as common knowledge (Kashin 2015), suggesting that these ideas have metastasized into broader Russian life. The fact that academics and officials once considered moderate such as Trenin, Lavrov and Medvedev are now in lock step with Russian government attitudes shows just how far these attitudes have penetrated Russian society (BBC 2022, Trenin 2022).
The rise in status as well as political and economic power of this group after Putin came to power in 1999 was rapid. Putin sought to create a ‘militocracy’ with ‘a stream of people in uniform (placed) into Russia’s power structures’ (Kryshtanovskaya & White 2003, 304). Evidence for this is best seen by the fact that by 2007 78% of the Russian elite were ‘Siloviki’ with military backgrounds, while 26% were ‘Inner Siloviki’ with specifically KGB or FSB backgrounds (Kryshtanovskaya 2007).
The rise of the siloviki and the creation of a ‘militocracy’ was so rapid that many elite surveys from the 1990s sort elites by demographics such as age, former communist party status and level of education but do not ask about military history (Hahn 1993). Although the ability of the group to coordinate other members has been disputed (Renz 2006), recent scholarship such as Dewisha’s Kleptocracy has revealed that certain KGB leaders prepared for the collapse of the USSR by secreting away assets abroad in the 1980s and working together towards capturing key parts of the Russian state (Dewisha 2014, 15-30).
For this group Putin fulfilled the role of a boss, a key member but also distant from clan politics, while appointees like Patrushev appointed their own cadres to positions below them, replicating power structures (Dewisha 2014). The fact that Putin is deeply tied to this faction means that its unity and cohesiveness matter less than for other factions which lack a clear leader and command structure. During the 1990s the Siloviki lacked the entrenched economic power of the oligarchs. This changed when the Siloviki (with Putin’s blessing) declared war against Khodorkovsky in 2003. Serving as modern day Oprichniki, the Siloviki waged a clandestine war to loot Khodorkovsky’s company Yukos (Ibid). This looting and seizure of one of Russia’s largest companies has effectively meant that no other faction has the resources to oppose the Siloviki and they have dominated Russian politics almost unopposed since the mid-2000s (Bremmer 2007).
Viewing Russian foreign policy through the lens of the primacy of this elite group allows a clearer understanding of many of Russia’s foreign policy actions, notably the willingness to compromise relations with nations such as the UK by assassinating ex-KGB officers who have broken the code of silence. Additionally, this conspiratorial thinking extends far beyond questions of NATO expansion, targeting most facets of life in a form of rapidly changing ‘everyday nationalism’ targeting minority groups and civil society organisations (Goode 2015).
Views of NATO Expansion
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new democratic system allowed public debate around foreign policy issues. Although almost all major views opposed NATO expansion in Eastern Europe without some bargain being made with Russia, there were significant differences in how elites believed that engagement with NATO should be managed ‘There are no principal objections to (the) necessity of NATO enlargement prevention. There are only discords in methods of this prevention: one group suggests stopping any relations with NATO, another one - to provide open dialogue’ (Gornostaev, 2001). This split between elites was important and broadly indicative of their elite grouping and ideology.
(Graphs taken from Kosals 2001)
As seen in tables 4 and 5 of a 2001 elite survey, views of NATO were highly indicative of views of Russian uniqueness and desire for revanchism. Respondents who were anti-NATO tended to embrace a unique Russian identity and opposed integration with the West. On the other hand, those that were neutral towards NATO were reformers: economic liberals and oligarchs who believed that although NATO expansion was undesirable Russia’s reaction should not undermine its economic interests in the West and elsewhere. In the 1990s both groups held significant power within Russia, with the Siloviki dominating the military and intelligence community and the liberals and oligarchs exerting significant control over Yeltsin and the presidency. However, relations with NATO were not considered a key priority of Russian elites in the 1990s and early 2000s (Kosals 2001, 5).
Just as in 2004, the 1999 NATO expansion did not happen in a vacuum. NATO intervention alongside Russia in the former Yugoslavia created tension and provoked a strong but short-lived public backlash. In 1998, 23% of Russians had a negative view of the US (which is seen as interchangeable with NATO); in 1999 this had risen to 54% before declining to 21% in 2000. Similarly, the number of Russians who said that they are afraid of NATO remained relatively constant between
Before 2004 Putin had broadly maintained the attitudes and rhetoric of the 1990s. He attended several NATO summits and was proactive in suggesting areas of cooperation. Much of his rhetoric focused on the joint threat of terrorism while often emphasising that NATO expansion would not make European countries more secure (Merand 2020). Putin accepted the 2004 expansion of NATO, saying at a joint NATO conference just after expansion, ‘Every country has the right to choose the option that it considers most effective for ensuring its own security… we hope that the expansion will help strengthen trust in Europe’ (Putin 2004). This clearly suggests that NATO expansion was not the driving force behind the change in rhetoric which came in the following years. In 2005 Lavrov confirmed that Ukraine would have a choice of NATO membership as a sovereign nation (lavrov 2005). Clearly, the reaction to the 2004 NATO expansion was not a key turning point for Russian attitudes.
Colour Revolutions
The colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 served (in the eyes of the Siloviki) both as vindication of the Siloviki’s general worldview and as a formative experience for the group. In Silovik culture, the political unrest that forced the rerun of rigged elections was caused by transnational networks of civil society groups and activists and could target Russia next. Additionally, the pro-Western governments that came to power after the colour revolutions and actively sought membership of the EU and NATO justified the hostility and opposition of the Siloviki to NATO expansion. This was especially true of Georgia with President Saakashvili inviting American advisors to train Georgian troops (Finkel 2013, chap. 1). The fear and anxiety caused by these revolutions has expressed itself in two ways within the Russian political system. Domestically Russian civil society has been securitised with many new security organs developed to repress the domestic population (Finkel 2013, chap. 2). Abroad, it has continuously attempted to undermine the governments of Ukraine and Georgia through invasion, political intrigue and energy manipulation. Indeed, the attempt to bring Georgia and Ukraine back into Russia’s fold has been a personal obsession of Russian elites (Marten 2015). However, Russia’s poor treatment of its neighbours has become a self-fulfilling prophecy as it has pushed countries like Ukraine closer to NATO and reduced the chance of rapprochement. This behaviour ensures national security issues never leave the top of the agenda in Russia and ensures that the almost-monopoly power of the Siloviki is protected.
Conclusion
In conclusion, since the 1990s there has been a Russian consensus that viewed NATO expansion negatively, with the difference of opinions only over to what lengths Russia should go to prevent expansion. Nevertheless, the Russian government begrudgingly accepted both the 1999 and 2004 NATO expansions. The shift in tone and rhetoric came firmly after the second expansion and had far more to do with the rise of the political dominance of the Siloviki as a faction and the reaction to the Colour Revolutions abroad. The complete dominance of this ‘militocracy’ over Russian society in the years since has ensured that few dissenting opinions exist and has created an all-consuming civilizational narrative which sees Russia as under constant threat from internal and external enemies. The logical consequence of this has been extreme, and has created a feedback loop where ever more assertive actions abroad further isolate Russia and simultaneously reinforce the power of an insular elite.
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